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Errors in Estimating Unexpected Accruals in the Presence of  




We demonstrate that the articulation among accruals, cash flows and revenues which 
is typically assumed in tests of earnings management does not hold when large 
(positive or negative) external financing activities are present. Our study provides 
evidence that managers’ “normal” operating decisions associated with net external 
financing activities are likely to lead to economically and statistically significant 
measurement errors in unexpected accruals. This is a serious concern given the 
frequency with which the partitioning variable used to identify instances of alleged 
earnings management is correlated with significant movements in net external 
financing. Simulation tests show that even at modest levels of net external financing 
changes, rejection frequencies for the null hypothesis of no earnings management rise 
dramatically. This result underscores the importance of additional specification tests 
being conducted to control for estimation biases in unexpected accruals associated 
with external financing. We suggest the use of matched-firm approach using industry 
and external financing matches. Using this approach, we demonstrate that prior 
conclusions about the existence of earnings management around open market 
repurchases (Gong et al. 2008) do not appear robust when attempts are made to 





Earnings management has been the focus of extensive research in accounting. In order 
to measure the extent of managed earnings, researchers typically rely on estimates of 
unexpected accruals which are based on a presumed articulation between accruals and 
a firm’s current period cash flows and/or near-term changes in revenues. While this 
research effort has provided numerous insights into the causes and consequences of 
earnings management it is also widely accepted that the existing accruals expectation 
models do not work well in identifying earnings management practices. Our paper 
adds to these concerns by demonstrating analytically and empirically that the 
presumed articulation among accruals, cash flows and revenues does not hold in the 
event of significant net external financing changes. In such circumstances, we show 
that commonly-used unexpected accruals measures are likely to contain economically 
and statistically significant measurement errors. 
 
Recent evidence of measurement errors in unexpected accruals induced by external 
financing is provided by Ball and Shivakumar (2008), who examine the extent of 
earnings management around initial public offerings (IPOs). They suggest two 
fundamental concerns with prior evidence claiming that IPO firms manage earnings 
upwards around the IPO. First, they argue that researchers typically pay insufficient 
attention to reasons as to why such firms may not want to engage in earnings 
management and/or why earnings management is likely to be expected and hence, 
detected.1 Second, and of more direct relevance to our analysis, they argue that a firm 
experiencing a large external financing inflow tends to use the received cash proceeds 
to increase its inventory and accounts receivable as a consequence of expanding its 
operations. These activities lead to dramatic increases in a firm’s working capital, with 
a rate of change for working capital significantly higher than that for revenues. Thus, 
                                                        
1 One exception is Shivakumar (2000), who argues that investors rationally undo the effects of 
earnings management occurring prior to a seasoned equity offering (SEO). 
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these transactions would be identified by existing models of unexpected accruals as 
income-increasing earnings management, even after controlling for the change in 
sales.2 This is true irrespective of whether accruals are estimated from changes in 
successive balance sheets or from statements of cash flow.3 As Ball and Shivakumar 
note, current accruals of this type have nothing to do with earnings management, but 
are simply a reflection of the rational investment of IPO proceeds in operating 
activities. 
 
While serving to raise serious questions about prior evidence of IPO earnings 
management, the analysis of Ball and Shivakumar (2008) also suggests a more 
general question, namely the effect on unexpected accrual measurement of significant 
net financing changes. For example, applying exactly the same reasoning, unexpected 
accruals models would likely categorize firms with large external financing cash 
outflows as engaging in income-decreasing earnings management. Many of the 
circumstances which give rise to expectations of possible earnings management are 
related to significant changes in net external financing, such as the sale of equity or debt, 
or significant adjustments by means of stock buybacks or debt reductions.4 Moreover, 
significant changes in net external financing, whether debt or equity-related, are likely 
to be correlated with many other circumstances alleged to give rise to an incentive to 
manage earnings. We therefore believe that a broader investigation of the effect of 
external financing changes is warranted, where external financing refers to both debt 
and equity. It is also worth noting that large net external financing events are reasonably 
common for Compustat firms. For example, Leary and Roberts (2005, Table III p. 2601) 
show that in 35,149 out of 127,308 firm quarters (i.e., 27.6% or just over once per 
calendar year on average) in their analysis of firms’ capital structures between 1984 and 
2001 there is a large debt issue (16,021 cases), debt retirement (10,920 cases), equity 
                                                        
2  Similarly, any attempt to pay-off pre-IPO operating liabilities is likely to be interpreted as 
income-increasing earnings management. 
3 This helps explain the finding in Ball and Shivakumar that the data underlying prior evidence of IPO 
earnings management (Teoh et al. 1998) show a 600.39% average increase in accounts receivable for 
the quartile of firms with the most overstated earnings. 
4 Fields et al. (2001) provide an extensive overview of much of this research. Studies with implications 
for capital market behaviour are also reviewed by Kothari (2001). 
 4
issue (6,867 cases) or equity repurchase (5,723 cases). Moreover, these financing 
events are large; with the median value of the financing event to firm market 
capitalization in the four groups being 12%, 15%, 9% and 2% respectively (Table IV, p. 
2603). 
 
We begin by investigating the relationship between accounting accruals and a firm’s net 
external financing. Accounting identities suggest that external financing and firm 
performance are two major contributors to the firm’s change in net operating assets, 
which provide a comprehensive measure of total accruals (Dechow et al. 2008; 
Richardson et al. 2005). Because the change in non-cash working capital, which is a 
part of the change in net operating assets, forms the core of the commonly used accruals 
measures (Dechow and Dichev 2002; Hribar and Collins 2002), both external financing 
and firm performance are positively associated with accounting accruals, regardless of 
the presence of earnings management. 
 
If accounting accruals are correctly decomposed into their unexpected and expected 
components and if external financing is not associated with the identified stimulus of 
earnings management, the positive relation between external financing and accounting 
accruals would not produce measurement errors in unexpected accruals. However, this 
is unlikely to be the case. Our univariate correlation analysis demonstrates a significant 
positive correlation between estimates of unexpected accruals and external financing, 
indicating that the measurement error in unexpected accruals is positively associated 
with external financing. In other words, the empirical evidence suggests a systematic 
bias in estimates of expected accruals that arises from the positive relationship between 
external financing and accounting accruals. We show that a firm’s operating decisions 
and the resulting accruals properties are more complex than those previously 
characterized by unexpected accruals models. By assuming that a firm’s normal, 
expected accruals decisions are predicted by current period cash flows and near term 
changes in sales, commonly-used unexpected accruals models are likely to 
erroneously classify firms with large external financing cash inflows (outflows) as 
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reporting positive (negative) unexpected accruals. 
 
Based upon the above observations, we provide empirical evidence that, on average, 
unexpected accruals estimates from the most widely used models of expected accruals 
exhibit a positive bias for firms with large external financing cash inflows, while 
unexpected accruals of firms with large external financing cash outflows exhibit a 
negative bias. To show these biases, we sort firms into quartiles each year based on 
net external financing, and compare the unexpected accruals measures across quartiles. 
We consider several of the most popular unexpected accruals models, namely the 
modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995), the Dechow-Dichev model (Dechow and 
Dichev 2002), the McNichols’s modification to the Dechow-Dichev model 
(McNichols 2002), and the modified Jones model with a control for firm performance 
(Kothari et al. 2005). 
 
We explore the extent to which these biases affect statistical inferences in tests of 
earnings management. By applying the framework of McNichols and Wilson (1988), 
we estimate the bias induced by failing to control for external financing. In particular, 
we show that the unexpected accruals models are correctly specified when a control 
for external financing is introduced by either of the following two approaches: (1) the 
regression-based approach that includes net external financing as an additional 
regressor in the unexpected accruals model; and (2) the matched-firm approach using 
industry and net external financing for the matching. The results suggest that the bias 
induced by external financing is economically significant, ranging from 0.2% to 3.5% 
of average total assets for different unexpected accruals measures. 
 
In addition, we examine the potential impact of external financing on statistical 
inferences in tests of earnings management. We regress unexpected accruals on two 
indicator variables for large external financing, and find the estimated coefficients on 
the indicator variables are all significant at the 1% level for unexpected accruals 
measures estimated without a control for external financing. Moreover, we conduct 
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simulations to examine the type I errors for different unexpected accruals measures 
with 0%-100% of the sample contaminated by firms with large net external financing. 
We report the percentage of time in 250 simulated samples that the null hypotheses of 
non-negative and non-positive unexpected accruals are rejected. The rejection rate 
frequencies rise dramatically for unexpected accruals when there is no control for 
external financing, even at low levels of contamination. The abnormal rejection rates 
persist even when net external financing is used as an additional regressor in the 
unexpected accruals models. In contrast, when an industry and external-financing 
matched-firm approach is used, all unexpected accruals models are well-specified. 
 
Consistent with our aim of examining the general effect of net external financing 
changes on measures of unexpected accruals, we also further decompose (overall) 
external financing into debt financing and equity financing, given the fact that equity 
issues occur more rarely (and are smaller in amount) than debt issues over the past 30 
years (Eckbo et al. 2007). We find that the presence of large net debt financing is 
more likely to induce measurement errors in unexpected accruals and bias test of 
earnings management.  
 
The final step in our analysis is to revisit a recent study that reports evidence of 
income-decreasing earnings management around share repurchases (Gong et al. 2008). 
Our evidence suggests that conclusions about the existence of earnings management 
in this context are not robust to controlling for the problem we have identified. Indeed, 
when using the matched-firm approach after controlling for the effect on expected 
accrual of significant net external financing movements, or the McNichols’s 
modification to the Dechow-Dichev model (McNichols 2002), we find no statistically 
significant evidence of earnings management around open-market repurchase over a 
similar period to that examined by Gong et al. 
 
Overall, our findings provide evidence that managers’ “normal” operating decisions 
associated with net external financing lead to biased estimates of unexpected accruals 
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and potentially erroneous statistical inferences identifying earnings management, even 
if earnings management is not present. Our research therefore complements recent 
studies that endeavor to improve the specification of tests of earnings management 
through the use of statement of cash flow data (Hribar and Collins 2002) and a control 
for firm performance (Kothari et al. 2005). Our study is also related to prior research 
that reports a significant relationship between a firm’s estimated unexpected accruals 
and several other firm characteristics, such as growth in long-term earnings 
(McNichols 2000), fixed asset structure (Young 1999) and changes in a firm’s 
operating environment over its life cycle (Liu 2008). We demonstrate empirically how 
tests of earnings management can be biased due to a firm’s external financing 
behavior, an event which is by definition associated with changes in net operating 
assets and expected accruals. 
 
External financing, especially external equity financing, is frequently argued to be one 
of the major incentives for earnings manipulations (see e.g. Graham et al. 2005). 
Accordingly, an alternative interpretation of our results is that current period earnings 
of firms with large external financing cash inflows are systematically managed 
upwards, while current period earnings of firms with large external financing cash 
outflows are managed downwards. As it is very difficult to distinguish managed 
earnings resulting from incentives of current period external financing from the 
measurement error in unexpected accruals induced by external financing, we cannot 
entirely rule out this alternative interpretation.  
 
However, given the pervasiveness of external financing activities in the U.S. 
(especially for external debt financing activities, see Eckbo et al. 2007), our results 
suggest that caution should prevail in interpreting evidence of earnings management 
when the identified stimulus is supposed to be uncorrelated (or weakly correlated) with 
external financing, but the sample contains a significant portion of firms with large net 
external financing. In such cases, the commonly-used unexpected accruals models are 
likely to erroneously classify firms with large net external financing as reporting 
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nonzero unexpected accruals, and “evidence of earnings management” might simply 
be due to managers’ “normal” operating decisions. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the 
relationship between net external financing and accounting accruals through 
accounting identities, and justifies the importance of controlling for external financing. 
Sample construction, descriptive statistics and correlation analysis are discussed in 
Section 3. Section 4 presents the results for tests of bias in earnings management 
associated with external financing, using simulations to evaluate external financing’s 
influence on statistical inferences of earnings management. The relative importance of 
debt and equity financing in measurement error is considered in Section 5. Section 6 
re-examines evidence of income-decreasing accruals management around share 




2.1. Bias in unexpected accruals calculation  
McNichols and Wilson (1988) and Dechow et al. (1995) suggest that an accrual-based 
test of earnings management can be interpreted as: 
εβ +∗=∗ PARTUEXAC                        (1) 
where UEXAC* is the true managed (unexpected) accruals, PART is a dummy variable 
that partitions the sample into two groups for which earnings management predictions 
are specified by the researcher, and ε a is random accruals error unrelated to the 
specific earnings management hypothesis.5 The true unmanaged (i.e., expected) 
accruals, EXAC*, can be interpreted as: 
η+= EXACEXAC*                         (2) 
where EXAC is an estimate of EXAC* obtained by regressing observed accruals on a 
                                                        
5 Note that the intercept term is omitted for notational convenience. In most research contexts, PART 
will be set equal to one in firm-years during which systematic earnings management is hypothesized 
(i.e., the event window) and zero during firm-years in which no systematic earnings management is 
hypothesized (i.e., the estimation window). 
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vector of variables (X) that are hypothesized to influence EXAC*, and η is the 
measurement error reflecting the effect of omitted variables in the estimation of 
EXAC* as well as idiosyncratic variation. Given the fact that UEXAC, the estimate of 
UEXAC*, is equal to accounting accruals minus EXAC, the correctly specified model 
for testing earnings management can be expressed as: 
εηβ ++∗= PARTUEXAC                      (3) 
 
As the true unexpected accruals (UEXAC*) and η are unobservable, tests of earnings 
management are normally characterized by the following regression for UEXAC with 
η omitted: 




σηρββγ η∗+=+= ),(ˆ                 (5) 
 
Equation (5) suggests that tests of earnings management can be biased owing to the 
omission of η, which captures the effect of the omitted relevant variables in estimating 
expected accruals. Given a significant and large bias, one could erroneously conclude 
the existence of earnings management (i.e., observe non-zero values of β), when in 
fact earnings may not be managed at all (i.e., β = 0). In particular, the direction of the 
bias depends on the sign of the correlation between PART and η, while the magnitude 
of bias depends on (1) the correlation between η and PART, (2) the standard deviation 
of η, and (3) the standard deviation of PART. 
 
2.2. The relation between external financing and unexpected accruals  
The above analysis suggests that tests of earnings management can be biased if the 
measurement error in unexpected accruals induced by omitted variables is correlated 
with the partitioning variable. In this section, we explore the relation between external 
financing and accounting accruals through accounting identities. 
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We start with the balance sheet identity: 
Total Assets = Total Liabilities + Owners Equity. (6) 
 
The most common financial liability is debt (D), while the most common financial 
asset is the balance of cash and short-term investments (CASH). Distinguishing 
financial assets and liabilities from operating assets and liabilities gives: 
CASH + Operating Assets = D + Operating Liabilities + Owners Equity.  (7) 
 
We define net operating assets (NOA) as the difference between operating assets and 
operating liabilities, and denote owners’ equity as E. Grouping the operating accounts 
on the left and the financial accounts on the right yields: 
NOA = D + E - CASH.                         (8) 
Note that the NOA expression on the left is the accounting accruals system’s estimate 
of the net value of the firm’s operations. We take the first difference of equation (8) 
(with first difference denoted by Δ) and yield: 
ΔNOA= ΔD + ΔE - ΔCASH.                      (9) 
 
We incorporate standard clean surplus assumptions for changes in equity and changes 
in debt: 
ΔE = INCOME + ΔEQUITY,                     (10a) 
ΔD = Interest Expense - Interest Paid + ΔDEBT,            (10b) 
 
where INCOME represents net income, ΔEQUITY is net cash proceeds received from 
equity holders (equity issuances less dividends and repurchases), ΔDEBT is net 
noninterest cash inflow received from to debt holders (debt issuances less debt 
repayments). 
 
Assuming that interest expense is equal to interest paid, rearrangement gives a 
simplified representation of equation (9) and (10): 
 11
ΔNOA = ΔDEBT + INCOME + ΔEQUITY - ΔCASH.  (11) 
 
Our measure of net external financing (ΔXFIN) is the sum of ΔDEBT and ΔEQUITY. 
Substituting yields: 
ΔNOA = ΔXFIN + INCOME - ΔCASH. (12) 
 
The expression ΔNOA on the left can be considered as a comprehensive measure of 
total accruals (see e.g. Dechow et al. 2008; Richardson et al. 2005), and decomposed 
into the changes in current net operating assets (ΔCO) and the changes in non-current 
net operating assets (ΔNCO). The commonly used measure of current accruals (CACC) 
and total accruals (TACC) are thus both part of ΔNOA. Equation (12) also suggests 
that external financing (ΔXFIN) and firm performance (INCOME) are two main 
contributors to changes in net operating assets (ΔNOA), as evidence by the correlation 
reported in Dechow et al. (2008, Table 2, p.550) of ΔNOA with ΔXFIN (0.545) and 
INCOME (0.261), these being significantly higher than the correlation with ΔCASH 
(0.003). 
 
Suppose that accruals are decomposed using well-specified accruals expectation 
models. We then have: 
UEXAC* + EXAC* + REST_ΔNOA = ΔXFIN + INCOME - ΔCASH. (13) 
where REST_ΔNOA represents the remainder of ΔNOA, net of accounting accruals 
(CACC or TACC). In tests of earnings management where the identified stimulus is 
not supposed to be associated with external financing, we would expect to observe no 
correlation between the estimates of UEXAC* and ΔXFIN. However, our correlation 
analysis suggests that, even if there is no systematic earnings management in the 
sample, we still observe a correlation between the estimated unexpected accruals 
(UEXAC) and ΔXFIN (correlation coefficients ranging from 0.05 to 0.21 for different 
measures of unexpected accruals). 
 
Recall that the true UEXAC* is equal to the estimated UEXAC less the measurement 
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error in the estimated expected accruals (η). The correlation between UEXAC and 
ΔXFIN indicates that some portion of expected accruals is captured by η, which will 
bias tests of earnings management. The magnitude of the bias depends not only on the 
correlation between η and the partitioning variable, but also on the standard deviation 
of η and the partitioning variable. Thus, ΔXFIN is one of the omitted variables that 
leads to bias in unexpected accruals calculations. In other words, this suggests that a 
manager’s normal expected accruals decisions should be captured not only by the 
association between accruals and a firm’s current period cash flows and near-term 
changes in revenues (as in commonly used unexpected accruals models), but also by 
external financing that reflects the firm’s investment and operating decisions.6 
 
The above analysis is also applicable to the relation between unexpected accruals and 
firm performance (i.e., INCOME, or alternatively ROA if scaled by total assets). We 
also observe a significant correlation between estimated UEXAC and INCOME 
(ranging from 0.17 to 0.43), suggesting that firm performance can also bias 
unexpected accruals calculations. Accordingly, firm performance (ROA) is used as a 
control when estimating unexpected accruals in recent studies (see e.g. Kothari et al. 
2005). Our study thus adds to this strand of literature by investigating the bias which 
failure to control for external financing causes in tests of earnings management. 
 
Although unexpected accruals proxies (e.g. the Jones model or the modified Jones 
model) are widely-used in the literature, the potential bias induced by external 
financing has attracted little attention. One exception is Ball and Shivakumar (2008) 
who argue that prior evidence of earnings management in IPOs (e.g., Teoh et al. 1998) 
is unreliable and biased in favour of apparent upward earnings management due to the 
use of the IPO proceeds. Their analysis sheds light on the channel through which 
external financing influences current period accruals and its unexpected component.  
                                                        
6 Of course, this analysis is also applicable to the relation between unexpected accruals and firm 
performance. We observe a correlation between estimated UEXAC and INCOME ranging from 0.17 to 
0.43, consistent with prior evidence that performance can also bias unexpected accrual estimates 
(Kothari et al. 2005). 
 13
 
Similarly, firms with large external financing cash inflows, either from equity 
financing or debt financing (or both), tend to expand their operations and investments 
in fixed assets, accompanied by investments in working capital to support growth. For 
example, designing, launching, and selling a new product requires a firm to not only 
build productive capacity through the purchase of fixed assets, but also to 
manufacture large quantities of inventory to reduce the probability of inventory 
shortage. Thus, the use of external financing for investments in working capital results 
in a faster rate of change in working capital than in revenues. As commonly used 
unexpected accruals models typically assume expected accruals are a function of cash 
flows from operations and/or changes in revenues, estimates of unexpected accruals 
from these models can be biased due to external financing and the follow-up 
investment in net operating assets. 
 
2.3. Controlling for external financing  
Our analysis suggests the need to control for current period external financing in tests 
of earnings management. One approach is to expand the set of independent variables 
in widely-used regression models of expected accruals. In this spirit, we utilize a 
regression-based approach by augmenting the accruals expectation models to include 
current period net external financing as an additional regressor. An alternative method 
is to adjust a firm’s unexpected accruals using an industry and ΔXFIN-matched firm 
approach. In particular, the matched-firm approach adjusts a firm’s estimated 
unexpected accruals by subtracting the corresponding unexpected accruals of a firm 
matched on the basis of industry and current period ΔXFIN. Such an approach would 
also mitigate the likelihood that the estimated unexpected accruals are systematically 
non-zero. 
 
The relative efficacy of the matched-firm approach versus the regression-based 
approach is ultimately an empirical issue. The regression-based approach imposes 
stationarity of the relation through time or in the cross-section, and more importantly, 
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imposes linearity on the relation between external financing and expected accruals. 
On the other hand, the matched-firm approach does not impose any particular 
functional form on the relation between external financing and accruals, but simply 
assumes homogeneity in the relation between external financing and accruals for the 
sample and matched firm (i.e., the sample and matched firm, on average, have the 
similar estimated unexpected accruals that are not attributable to the identified 
stimulus of earnings management).7 Thus, the efficiency of these two approaches 
depends on how their corresponding assumptions are satisfied in the data. As a result, 
we examine both approaches in the following and compare their relative efficiency 
empirically. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
 
3.1. Sample composition 
The data for this study are obtained from the COMPUSTAT Industrial Annual 
database for the period 1987-2006, as statement of cash flow data are only available 
from 1987. Observations are deleted if any of the following conditions are met: (1) 
Primary industry classification is from the banking, life insurance, or property and 
casualty insurance industries; (2) Book value of assets is less than $1 million dollars 
or missing;8 (3) Missing values for sales, or net income before extraordinary items. 
These restrictions reduce the sample to 136,095 firm-years. 
 
Following Bradshaw et al. (2006), we measure the net amount of cash flow received 
                                                        
7 An important issue associated with the matched-firm approach is whether the use of industry and 
ΔXFIN-matched control firms removes, in part, unexpected accruals motivated from the identified 
stimulus of earnings management, and thus reduces the power of tests of earnings management. It is 
true that matching on external financing by design can and will remove unexpected accruals that are 
motivated by external financing, thereby generating “abnormal” unexpected accruals rather than “total” 
unexpected accruals. However, the matching approach is designed to capture the earnings management 
effect that is beyond that attributable to external financing. If the incentive for earnings management of 
interest is not supposed to be associated with external financing, the use of ΔXFIN-matched unexpected 
accruals is appropriate in controlling for the misspecification of the unexpected accruals models 
associated with external financing. 
8 This ensures that average total assets are greater than $1 million to avoid small denominator 
problems. 
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from external financing activities (ΔXFIN) as the sum of ΔEQUITY and ΔDEBT.9 
ΔEQUITY represents net cash received from the sale (and/or purchase) of common 
and preferred stock less cash dividends paid (COMPUSTAT annual data #108 less 
#115 less #127).10 ΔDEBT represents net cash received from the issuance (and/or 
reduction) of debt (COMPUSTAT annual data #111 less #114 plus #301). We require 
the availability of COMPUSTAT data for each of the above variables, with the 
exception of Change in Current Debt (COMPUSTAT annual data #301), which is set 
to 0 if it is missing.11 Bradshaw et al. (2006) find that COMPUSTAT typically 
backfills data for newly-listed public companies. As a result, ΔEQUITY primarily 
reflects both initial public offerings (IPO) and seasoned equity offerings (SEO), while 
ΔDEBT includes convertible debt, subordinated debt, notes payable, debentures and 
capitalized lease obligations. We scale ΔXFIN, ΔEQUITY and ΔDEBT by average 
total assets (COMPUSTAT item #6) so as to measure the amount of new financing 
activity relative to the existing asset base.  
 
As in previous research using financial ratios, we find that the distributions of our 
scaled financial variables are characterized by a small number of outliers (2,853 out of 
136,095 firm-years). We thus follow Bradshaw et al. (2006)’s procedure of 
eliminating observations with an absolute value greater than one.12 To examine the 
robustness of our results, we also employ an alternative measure of ΔXFIN, defined as 
ΔXFIN less the changes in cash and cash equivalents (COMPUSTAT annual data 
#274). As the results are generally similar, in the following we only report our 
findings for ΔXFIN. 
 
                                                        
9 We use the statement of cash flow data to measure external financing variables, because the 
statement of cash flow data does not suffer from the limitations described for the balance sheet data 
(Hribar and Collins, 2002). 
10 We are unable to decompose common and preferred equity from the statement of cash flows, since 
Compustat does not provide this level of detail. 
11 This is consistent with Bradshaw et al. (2006), who find that the availability of COMPUSTAT 
annual data #301 was very limited, in contrast to other variables. 
12 This procedure makes sense on a priori grounds, because situations where individual financing 
components change by more than 100% of average total assets are clearly unusual cases that we do not 
want to weight excessively in our analysis. Our results are qualitatively similar if we winsorize the 
observations, or if we leave them in the analysis. 
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Finally, following Kothari et al. (2005), we exclude observations if the absolute value 
of total or current accruals scaled by average total assets exceeds one. Our final 
sample consists of 131,778 firm-year observations. For these firms we compute total 
and current unexpected accruals using the modified Jones model (with intercept) 
(hereafter, denoted UEXAC_MJT and UEXAC_MJC, respectively), unexpected 
accruals from the Dechow–Dichev (2002) model and McNichols (2002)’s modification 
to the Dechow–Dichev (2002) model (denoted UEXAC_DD and UEXAC_DDM, 
respectively), total and current unexpected accruals from the modified Jones model 
with the intercept and ROA as an additional regressor (denoted UEXAC_MJT_ROA and 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA, respectively), and performance-matched total and current 
unexpected accruals as in Kothari et al. (2005) (denoted UEXAC_PMJT and 
UEXAC_PMJC, respectively). We use statement of cash flow data to construct total 
accruals (TACC) and current accruals (CACC), as suggested by Hribar and Collins 
(2002).13  
 
To control for net external financing, we utilize two approaches: First, we use a  
regression-based approach that includes ΔXFIN as an additional regressor in the 
above unexpected accruals models. Second, we use a matched-firm approach that 
adjusts a firm’s estimated unexpected accruals by subtracting the corresponding 
unexpected accruals of a firm matched on the basis of industry and current period 
ΔXFIN. To mitigate the effect of outliers, we eliminate the top and bottom percentile 
of variables required as inputs to accruals expectation models, namely total accruals 
(TACC), current accruals (CACC), cash flows from operations (CFO), changes in 
revenues (∆REV), gross property, plant, and equipment (PPE), and return-on-asset 
(ROA). The Appendix provides a detailed discussion on the estimation of different 
unexpected accruals measures. Table 1 reconciles the number of observations in the 
final sample with the data sources noting the effects of the various filters, and Table 2 
summarizes the COMPUSTAT items used in defining all variables. 
                                                        
13 Our results remain qualitatively and quantitatively similar when using the balance sheet data as in 
Kothari et al. (2005). 
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Table 1 and Table 2 about here 
 
3.2. Descriptive statistics 
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics for the unexpected accruals calculations and 
the external financing variables, as well as other firm characteristics. Note that all 
variables are scaled by average total assets to reflect their changes relative to the 
existing asset base, and are reported as percentages. As expected, the mean and the 
median of the distributions of unexpected accruals are close to zero (by 
construction), except those for the performance-matched and ΔXFIN-matched 
unexpected accruals. 
 
We also report univariate statistics for the external financing variables. The 
positive mean values for ΔXFIN, ΔDEBT and ΔEQUITY of 4.34%, 1.37% and 
2.97%, respectively, suggesting an overall tendency towards raising additional 
external financing. The medians, however, are all close to zero, indicating that the 
distributions of the three external financing variables are skewed to the right. 
 
When decomposing ΔNOA into ΔXFIN, net income (INCOME) and ΔCASH, we 
find that changes in net operating assets are on average funded by external financing 
rather than retained earnings, as evidence by a positive mean of ΔXFIN (4.34%) and 
a negative mean of net income (-2.52%). However, the standard deviations for 
ΔXFIN, net income and ΔNOA are similar, ranging from a low of 16.55% for 
ΔXFIN to a high of 20.05% for ΔNOA. Thus, changes in net operating assets are 
dominated by both ΔXFIN and net income or ROA [as in Kothari et al. (2005)]. 
 
Table 3 about here 
 
3.3. Correlation analysis and sorting on ΔXFIN 
To determine whether and how strongly the unexpected accruals measures are 
associated with external financing variables, we present correlations among our 
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sample variables in Table 4.14 Pearson (Spearman) correlations appear below (above) 
the diagonal. As a natural consequence of utilizing a large dataset, most of the 
correlations are statistically significant. 
 
There is a positive correlation between ΔXFIN and unexpected accruals, indicating 
that firms with positive net external financing tend to have relatively high unexpected 
accruals. As expected, we observe a substantial difference between the correlation of 
unexpected accruals measures (with and without a control for external financing) and 
ΔXFIN. The Pearson (Spearman) correlations range from 0.05 to 0.21 (from 0.10 to 
0.25), in contrast to Pearson and Spearman correlations for those matched on ΔXFIN 
that are close to zero. 
 
The correlations of ΔXFIN and net income with different components of ΔNOA reveal 
additional insights on how external financing influences accounting accruals and 
estimates of unexpected accruals. The Pearson (Spearman) correlation of ΔXFIN with 
ΔNOA is 0.41 (0.43), higher than that of net income. However, when decomposing 
ΔNOA into ΔCO and ΔNCO, we find that the higher correlation between ΔXFIN and 
ΔNOA is sourced from a higher correlation between ΔXFIN and ΔNCO (0.37 compared 
to 0.18 for Pearson correlation, and 0.35 compared to 0.23 for Spearman correlation). 
These correlations are indicative of financing and operating activities, whereby capital 
investments in net non-current operating assets are more likely to be funded by external 
financing than retained earnings. 
 
Table 4 about here 
 
To enhance our understanding on the relation between ΔXFIN and unexpected 
accruals, we first sort firms into quartiles each year based on ΔXFIN, and then report 
the sample average of all variables for each quartile in Table 5. The results in Table 5 
                                                        
14 For brevity, correlation results for unexpected accrual measures based on current accruals are not 
presented here, but are available upon request. 
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confirm a positive correlation between ΔXFIN and unexpected accruals. In particular, 
moving from the lower quartile to the upper quartile, we find that unexpected accruals 
(that fail to control for external financing) increase monotonically. For example, 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA without controls for ΔXFIN increases from -1.40% of total assets 
for Quartile 1 to 2.69% for Quartile 4, while UEXAC_DDM rises from -0.34% to 
0.45%. When comparing the efficacy of two methods to control for external financing, 
the matched-firm approach seems to be more efficient because there is no apparent 
pattern for unexpected accruals across quartiles. UEXAC_MJT_ROA matched on 
ΔXFIN is -0.04% of total assets for Quartile 1 and -0.03% for Quartile 4, while 
UEXAC_DDM is -0.06% and -0.05%, respectively. 
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Overall, the correlation and sorting results provide evidence that supports a consistent 
positive relation between ΔXFIN and unexpected accruals, suggesting that some 
portion of expected accruals are incorrectly classified as unexpected accruals, leading 
to bias in tests of earnings management. Although the positive relation is modest and 
more apparent in the Spearman correlations, the following analysis shows that even 
modest correlation can lead to significant biases in estimates of unexpected accruals 




4. Estimating unexpected accruals and external financing 
 
4.1. Estimating the bias in the calculation of unexpected accruals 
The framework proposed by McNichols and Wilson (1988) provides practical guides 
in estimating the potential impact of mis-specified unexpected accruals in tests of 
earnings management. By applying the framework in equation (1) through (5), we 
directly estimate the potential bias arising from a failure to control for ΔXFIN. There 
are at least two partitions that are potentially correlated with this measurement error: 
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PARTΔXFIN>Q3 and PARTΔXFIN<Q1. In particular, we define PARTΔXFIN>Q3 as a dummy 
variable taking value of 1 when the firm’s ΔXFIN is higher than the 75th percentile of 
the distribution in the corresponding year, and zero otherwise. Similarly, 
PARTΔXFIN<Q1 is a dummy variable set equal to 1 if the firm’s ΔXFIN is lower than the 
25th percentile of the distribution on a yearly basis, and zero otherwise. 
 
Table 6 provides evidence of the bias in tests of earnings management that arise when 
the partitioning variable coincides with each of these two partitions. The measurement 
error, η, is the difference between the unexpected accruals measures with and without 
a control for external financing. Take UEXAC_MJT as an example. Under the 
assumption that the modified Jones model with ΔXFIN as an additional regressor is 
correctly specified, η is measured as the difference between UEXAC_MJT estimated 
from the original modified Jones model and the estimate from the modified Jones 
model with ΔXFIN as an additional regressor. Panel A of Table 6 shows the estimated 
bias if the unexpected accruals matched on ΔXFIN are expected to be correctly 
specified. As shown in the second column of Panel A, the bias associated with 
PARTΔXFIN>Q3 ranges from 0.53% of total assets for UEXAC_DDM to 3.53% for 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA. This is adjudged as economically significant given that the median 
accounting earnings of the sample is 1.7% of total assets. The bias associated with 
PARTΔXFIN<Q1 is smaller in magnitude but of opposite direction, ranging from -0.51% 
for UEXAC_DDM to -3.14% for UEXAC_MJT_ROA. Panel B reports that the 
unexpected accruals models that include ΔXFIN as a control procedure are 
well-specified. In general, the estimated biases associated with both PARTΔXFIN>Q3 and 
PARTΔXFIN<Q1 are smaller in magnitude than those in Panel A. 
 
Table 6 about here 
 
The above analysis provides evidence of a significant bias in unexpected accruals 
estimation. It, however, does not provide direct evidence of the potential impact on 
 21
statistical inferences. To address this issue, we examine if statistical inferences change 
due to measurement error sourced from ΔXFIN. Specially, unexpected accruals are 
regressed on each of the two partitioning variables on a yearly basis. Table 7 reports 
the sample average of the 20 individual-year parameter estimates and its significance 
across all years. If the unexpected accruals models are correctly specified, we would 
expect the coefficients on PART to be insignificantly different from zero, given that 
there is no obvious reason for the existence of significant earnings management 
associated with either of the two partitions for such a large sample. 
 
The results in Table 7 support our conjecture that statistical inference in tests of 
earnings management hinge on whether or not a control for ΔXFIN is included. 
Specifically, the second column of Panel A demonstrates that firms with large external 
financing cash inflows tend to exhibit evidence of significant income increasing 
earnings management, while firms with large external financing cash outflows tend to 
be classified as income decreasing earnings managers, even if earnings management 
does not actually exist. The estimated coefficients on PARTΔXFIN>Q3 range from 0.63% 
to 3.70%, and have significant t-statistics at the 1% level (ranging from 4.7 to 13.8). 
The estimated coefficients on PARTΔXFIN<Q1 are similar in magnitude but of the 
opposite direction, with even more significant t-statistics. When we control for ΔXFIN 
by using either the regression-based approach or the matched-firm approach, the same 
partition shows less significant (or even insignificant) bias in testing earnings 
management. In particular, results in Panel C for the regression-based approach 
demonstrate that the estimated coefficients on both PARTΔXFIN>Q3 and PARTΔXFIN<Q1 
reduce substantially in magnitude, but are still statistically significant. When matching 
on ΔXFIN, the results in Panel B show that the estimated coefficients on both 
PARTΔXFIN>Q3 and PARTΔXFIN<Q1 are economically and statistically insignificant, 
ranging from -0.21% to 0.27%. 
 
Table 7 about here 
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4.2. Simulation analysis 
The results in Table 7 assume a 100% overlap between the partitioning variable used 
in tests of earnings management and large net external financing (either PARTΔXFIN>Q3 
or PARTΔXFIN<Q1). However, the partitioning variable chosen by the researcher rarely 
overlaps perfectly. Rather, the sample is often only partially contaminated by firms 
with large net external financing, and the degree of contamination varies depending 
on the identified stimulus for earnings management. Accordingly, we conduct 
simulations to estimate the potential bias in tests of earnings management where the 
partitioning variable is imperfectly correlated with net external financing. 
 
Our simulation procedure follows Hribar and Collins (2002). In particular, we start by 
taking a random sample of 1,000 firms without replacement from the subsample of 
firms that are not involved in large net external financing (i.e., firms with both 
PARTΔXFIN>Q3 and PARTΔXFIN<Q1 equal to 0). This is referred to as our 0% 
contamination sample. Using 250 iterations of this procedure, we calculate bias in 
tests of earnings management (as a percentage of total assets) as in Equation (5), the 
difference between unexpected accruals estimated from models without and with 
controlling for ΔXFIN (i.e., η as in Equation (5)), and the probability of committing a 
type I error if there is no earnings management present. Based on 250 trials, we 
compute the rejection frequencies (i.e., type I error rates) at the 5% and 1% 
significance levels for a one tailed t-test, together with the sample average of the 
estimated biases and differences. Next, we increase the percent contaminated to 10% 
by taking a random sample of 100 firms without replacement from the subsample of 
firms with large net external financing (i.e., firms with PARTΔXFIN>Q3 =1 for tests of 
PARTΔXFIN>Q3, and firms with PARTΔXFIN<Q1 = 1 for tests of PARTΔXFIN<Q1) and a 
random sample of 900 firms without replacement from the subsample of firms with 
moderate ΔXFIN. We repeat this procedure 250 times, and measure the bias and 
rejection frequency at the 10% level of contamination. We continue this procedure 
until the percent of the sample contaminated by firms with large external financing 
cash inflows or outflows is 100%. 
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The estimation bias associated with PARTΔXFIN>Q3 and PARTΔXFIN<Q1 at different 
contamination levels are reported in Panel A and Panel B of Table 8 (A1 and B1 for 
PARTΔXFIN>Q3, and A2 and B2 for PARTΔXFIN<Q1). Generally, the biases are found to 
be smaller in magnitude for the contaminated sample, relative to the biases for the 
whole sample in Table 6. For example, when the unexpected accruals with ΔXFIN as 
an additional regressor are expected to be well-specified, the bias associated with 
PARTΔXFIN>Q3 (Panel B1 of Table 8) average about 0.86% for UEXAC_MJT, 2.89% 
for UEXAC_MJT_ROA, 0.69% for UEXAC_PMJT, 1.24% for UEXAC_DD and 
0.27% for UEXAC_DDM, with low fluctuation across different contamination levels. 
However, the estimation biases associated with both PARTΔXFIN>Q3 and PARTΔXFIN<Q1 
are still economically significant for those contaminated samples. On the other hand, 
as the contamination level increases, the differences between unexpected accruals 
with and without a control for ΔXFIN increase monotonically for PARTΔXFIN>Q3 and 
decrease for PARTΔXFIN<Q1 (see Panel C and Panel D of Table 8). For example, the 
difference of UEXAC_MJT assuming unexpected accruals matched on ΔXFIN is the 
true model (i.e., UEXAC_MJT in Panel C1) increases from 0.47% of total assets for 
the 10% contamination level to 1.16% for the 90% contaminated sample, when testing 
the simulated sample with net external financing inflows (i.e., testing PARTΔXFIN>Q3). 
However, the difference of UEXAC_MJT reduces from 0.21% for 10% contamination 
to -1.12% for 90% contamination level, when the simulated sample is contaminated 
by firms with net external financing outflows (see Panel C2 of Table 8). 
 
Table 8 about here 
 
Results of the probability of committing a type I error for PARTΔXFIN>Q3 and 
PARTΔXFIN<Q1 are tabulated in Table 9 and Table 10. Because the results for the 1% 
significance level are generally similar to those for the 5% significant level, we only 
discuss the 5% results in Table 9. 
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Table 9 and Table 10 about here 
 
We first look at the results for PARTΔXFIN>Q3 without a control for ΔXFIN (see Panel A 
of Table 9). At the 0% contamination level, all unexpected accruals models are 
relatively well-specified, with the empirical rejection frequencies ranging from 2.0% 
to 8.0%. However, as the percent of the sample contaminated rises, the probability of 
committing a type I error increases dramatically for all models, except the 
Dechow-Dichev model and the McNichols’s modification to the Dechow-Dichev 
model. For example, even when the sample is only 30% contaminated, the 
probabilities of committing type I errors in the absence of earnings management are 
over 60%, in contrast to the expected level under the null of 5%. Moreover, when the 
percent of the sample contaminated by firms with large ΔXFIN rises to 40%, the type 
I error rates increase to 68% for UEXAC_MJT, 99% for UEXAC_MJT_ROA, 78% for 
UEXAC_PMJT, 92% for UEXAC_MJC, 98% for UEXAC_MJC_ROA, and 86% for 
UEXAC_PMJC, respectively. Thus, at contamination levels of 40% and greater, one 
would be likely to conclude that earnings had indeed been manipulated, even if 
earnings management is not present. It is also noteworthy that among the eight 
unexpected accruals models, the McNichols’s modification to the Dechow-Dichev 
model is relatively well-specified in terms of lower rejection frequencies for different 
levels of contamination. For example, when the sample is 40% contaminated, the 
probabilities of committing type I errors is 33%. Even if there is a 100% overlap 
between the partitioning variable and PARTΔXFIN>Q3, the type I error rate is 67%, in 
contrast to nearly 100% for other models. 
 
Results for PARTΔXFIN<Q1 presented in Panel D of Table 9 are qualitatively similar to 
those in Panel A. At the 0% contamination level, the probabilities of committing type 
I errors ranges from 2% to 21%, indicating that all the models are relatively 
well-specified except UEXAC_MJC_ROA and UEXAC_DD. As the level of 
contamination in the sample increases, the rejection frequencies increase accordingly, 
although not as quickly as they do for PARTΔXFIN>Q3. For example, at the 30% 
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contamination level, the type I error rates for most unexpected accruals models 
(except UEXAC_MJT and UEXAC_DDM) are over 50%, in contrast to the expected 
5%. Consistent with results for PARTΔXFIN>Q3, the McNichols’s modification to the 
Dechow-Dichev model is relatively well-specified, with a lower type I error rate of 
8.8% at the 30% contamination level. Overall, results for unexpected accruals models 
without a control for ΔXFIN suggest that even a modest level of contamination by 
firms with large net external financing can have a potentially large impact on the 
statistical inferences that are drawn on the existence of earnings management. 
 
When we control for ΔXFIN by using a matched-firm procedure, all unexpected 
accruals models become well-specified at any contamination level (see Panel B and 
Panel E of Table 9). For example, the type I error rates are ranging from 2.0% to 5.2% 
for PARTΔXFIN>Q3, and from 4.8% to 7.6% for PARTΔXFIN<Q1, even the sample is 100% 
contaminated. 
 
However, the regression-based approach that includes ΔXFIN as an additional 
regressor in unexpected accruals models is insufficient to mitigate the potential bias 
from ΔXFIN in tests of earnings management. Results for PARTΔXFIN>Q3 in Panel C of 
Table 9 show that all the models are mis-specified at almost any level of 
contamination, with significantly higher type I errors than the expected level of 5%. 
For example, when the sample is not contaminated, the type I error rates are 28.4% 
for UEXAC_MJT, 44.8% for UEXAC_MJT_ROA, 21.2% for UEXAC_MJC, 16% for 
UEXAC_PMJC, and 8.8% for UEXAC_DDM. On the other hand, results for 
PARTΔXFIN<Q1 demonstrate that, compared to results without controlling for ΔXFIN, 
the rejection frequencies reduce slightly; but one would still be likely to reject the null 
of no earnings management even in the absence of earnings manipulation. 
 
5. Debt financing versus equity financing 
 
Eckbo et al. (2007) study the aggregate debt and equity issuance activity in the U.S. 
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during the period 1980–2003, with a population of 83,282 issues. In particular, they 
find that straight debt offerings outnumber SEOs by approximately three to one 
(37,298 vs. 11,151), and the typical public debt issue is about three times as large as 
the average SEO ($230 versus $86 million). They thus suggest that, consistent with 
the early finding of Mikkelson and Partch (1986), equity issues are rarer in issuance 
frequency and smaller in amount than debt issues. 
 
Our analysis above suggests that the presence of large net (overall) external financing 
(ΔXFIN) tends to induce measurement errors in unexpected accruals and biased tests 
of earnings management. Given the pervasiveness of external debt issuance, a natural 
question is whether such measurement errors are more likely caused by net debt 
financing (ΔDEBT) or net equity financing (ΔEQUITY). To investigate the relative 
importance of debt and equity financing, we examine how the statistical inferences on 
earnings management change due to measurement error from ΔDEBT and ΔEQUITY. 
In particular, we regress unexpected accruals on the partitioning variables based on 
ΔDEBT and ΔEQUITY each year, and report the sample average and significance of 
the 20 individual-year parameter estimates in Table 11. 
 
Table 11 about here 
 
The results in Table 11 still support our findings that firms with large external 
financing cash inflows (outflows) tend to be classified as income increasing 
(decreasing) earnings managers, regardless of whether their financing is via debt or 
equity. For example, all estimated coefficients on both PARTΔDEBT>Q3 and 
PARTΔDEBT<Q1 are statistically significant at 1% level except UEXAC_DDM for 
PARTΔDEBT<Q1, with economically significant estimation errors ranging from -0.36% 
to 3.25% of total assets. The evidence for equity financing is weaker, but most 
estimated coefficients on both PARTΔEQUITY>Q3 and PARTΔEQUITY<Q1 are still 
statistically significant, though with smaller magnitudes relative to debt financing. 
Overall, the results suggest that unexpected accruals estimates for firms with large net 
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debt financing are more likely to contain measurement errors and bias tests of 
earnings management than firms with large equity financing. 
 
6. Unexpected accruals around share repurchases 
 
The results of the previous sections suggest that estimated unexpected accruals exhibit 
a bias that is related to a firm’s external financing behaviour, and this bias could lead 
the researcher to conclude that significant earnings management exists, when in fact 
there is none. This bias is also more likely to occur for firms with large net debt 
financing cash flows, in contrast to firms with large net equity financing cash flows. 
 
To provide further insights on how controlling for external financing is likely to 
change empirical inferences, we re-examine the evidence of income-decreasing 
earnings management around share repurchases. Gong et al. (2008) report significant 
negative unexpected accruals around open-market repurchases. However, managers’ 
“normal” operating and financing decisions associated with the reduction of debt 
levels (i.e., net debt financing cash outflows) could also lead to negatively biased 
estimates of unexpected accruals, and these firms can exhibit a pattern of unexpected 
accruals that is likely to be similar to firms making share repurchases. 
 
We identify open-market repurchases for 1988-2002 from the Security Data 
Company’s (SDC) Mergers and Acquisitions database. Following Gong et al. (2008), 
we utilize a conditional procedure to identify repurchase announcements. In particular, 
conditional on an share repurchase announcement appearing in SDC, we require the 
dollar value of actual repurchases in a given fiscal year based on Compustat annual 
data item #115 (Purchases of Common and Preferred Stock) to exceed 1% of the 
firm’s market value.15 We also exclude block-repurchases and self-tender offers. The 
                                                        
15 We combine the two data sources (SDC and Compustat) because, on the one hand, SDC generally 
codes a repurchase as complete only after the firm essentially repurchases all the shares that it intended 
to repurchase. Therefore, partial repurchases are generally coded as pending and the number of shares 
repurchased is not reported. On the other hand, Compustat annual data item #115 is an aggregation of 
many other types of transactions besides open-market repurchases, including conversions of other 
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final sample has 1,050 open-market repurchase announcements that are followed by 
actual repurchases during the year of the repurchase announcement.16 We re-examine 
tests of income-decreasing earnings management for firms making open-market 
repurchases, and then we show how controlling for the firm’s external financing is 
likely to change inferences. 
 
We begin our re-examination by first calculating mean unexpected accruals around 
open-market repurchases without considering external financing. We calculate the 
several different unexpected accruals estimates as used in our tests above, and present 
the results in Table 12. We find that on average, repurchase firms report significantly 
negative unexpected for UEXAC_MJT and UEXAC_PMJT accruals representing 
0.57% and 1.08% of total assets respectively (with a robust t-statistic of -2.24 and 
-3.35 respectively), confirming those reported in Gong et al. (2008).17 
 
Table 12 about here 
 
Grullon and Michaely (2004) document that a typical repurchasing firm has ample 
cash reserves prior to open-market repurchases, suggesting that managerial decision 
on net debt financing is not supposed to be relevant to the decision on share 
repurchases. We sort the repurchase sample according to net external debt financing 
(ΔDebt) based on the quartile breakpoints of the whole Compustat sample, and 
re-calculate the average unexpected accruals within each group. The pattern of 
unexpected accruals for repurchase firms shows that negative unexpected accruals are 
concentrated among firms in the quartile 1 and quartile 2, which are characterized as 
firms with net debt financing cash outflows. Take UEXAC_MJT as an example. The 
                                                                                                                                                               
classes of stock into common stock, purchases of treasury stock, retirements of common or preferred 
stock, and redemptions of redeemable preferred stock. Thus, Compustat data item #115 may have a 
positive value even when no open-market repurchase occurs. Our conditional procedure is utilized to 
reduce the noise associated with using Compustat data item #115 to estimate actual repurchases. 
16 We find our results for unexpected accruals on a yearly basis are qualitatively and quantitatively 
comparable to those reported in Gong et al. (2008) who use quarterly data. 
17 Gong et al. (2008) report negative unexpected accruals consisting of 0.57% of total assets for 
unexpected accruals based on the modified Jones model (see p.960 of Gong et al. (2008) in Panel A of 
Table II). 
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1,050 repurchase firms are equally distributed across quartiles, indicating the 
contamination level of net debt financing outflow is about 25%. There are 232 and 
268 observations in quartile 1 and quartile 2 respectively, representing about 50% of 
the whole sample. Repurchase firms in quartile 1 and quartile 2 report significantly 
negative unexpected accruals of -1.85% and -1.17%, with robust t-statistics of -3.01 
and -2.50 respectively. In contrast, firms in quartile 4 with large external debt 
financing cash inflows are found to exhibit income-increasing earnings management. 
These findings show that managers of repurchase firms with net debt financing inflow 
do not appear to engage in income-decreasing earnings management concurrent with 
repurchase announcement. 
 
To further investigate this issue, we estimated UEXAC_ΔDebt (UEXAC_ΔXFIN) by 
using a matching procedure based on industry and net external debt (overall) 
financing for UEXAC_MJT. We found that after controlling for external financing, the 
unexpected accruals for UEXAC_DDM, UEXAC_ΔDebt and UEXAC_ΔXFIN are not 
significantly different from zero for the whole sample and across quartiles. In 
particular, the average unexpected accruals for UEXAC_ΔDebt is 0.57% of total 
assets for the whole sample and ranges from -0.28% to 1.11% across quartiles, all of 
which have insignificant t-statistics. 
 
Thus, although researchers might conclude based on the first two columns of Table 12 
Panel A that the average firm records negative unexpected accruals concurrent with 
open-market repurchases, Panel B reveals that these findings hold only for firms with 
net external debt financing cash outflows. The overall results in Table 12 show that 
managers’ “normal” operating and financing operations, not necessarily the share 




Most research in the earnings management literature requires a proxy for managed 
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earnings. This paper explores the notion that the widely-used unexpected accruals 
measures suffer from specification errors, when the sample contains firms with large 
net external financing. In particular, this study examines the potential bias in estimates 
of unexpected accruals arising from external financing and its impact on statistical 
inferences in identifying earnings management. 
 
After exploring the positive relation between accounting accruals and external 
financing through accounting identities, we first provide evidence on the correlation 
between estimates of unexpected accruals and external financing, suggesting the 
existence of measurement errors in unexpected accruals sourced from external 
financing. We then demonstrate that unexpected accruals from different accruals 
expectation models are considerably biased upwards for firms with large external 
financing cash inflows, and biased downwards for firms with large cash outflows. The 
simulations show that even a modest proportion of firms with large net external 
financing in the sample dramatically inflate rejection rates for tests at the 5% and 1% 
significance level. The regression-based approach that includes the external financing 
variable as an additional regressor does not improve the test specification, while the 
use of the matched-firm procedure based upon industry and external financing 
generates well-specified type I error rates. Overall, our results show that failure to 
control for external financing causes biased estimates of unexpected accruals, and 
could lead to the erroneous conclusion that significant earnings management exists 
when in fact there is none. 
 
Our findings have implications for studies designed to detect earnings management 
and the estimation of unexpected and expected accruals. This is especially pertinent in 
cases where the partitioning variable used to identify instances of earnings 
management is supposed to be uncorrelated with external financing, when in fact the 
two are correlated. Our results suggest that it would be prudent for researchers to 
consider the relation between the partitioning variable and external financing, and 
underscore the importance of additional tests to control for possible errors in 
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unexpected accruals measurement introduced by external financing. This can be 
achieved by examining the robustness of results for a sub-sample of firms that are not 
involved in net external financing activities or using the matched-firm approach based 
on industry and external financing. 
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Appendix: Unexpected accruals models 
A.1 The Modified-Jones Model 
Jones (1991) assumes that expected accruals depend on accounting (economic) 
fundamentals like the change in revenues and the level of property, plant, and 

























1             (A1) 
where TACCi,t-1, ATAi,t-1 are firm i’s total accruals and average total assets for year t-1, 
ΔREVi,t is the change in firm i’s revenues between year t-1 and t and PPEit is the gross 
value of property, plant and equipment for firm i in year t. Once the model is 
estimated (either in time-series or cross-sectionally), the fitted values are used as 
estimated expected accruals, and the residuals are considered as unexpected accruals. 
 
The original Jones model implicitly assumes that discretion is not exercised over 
revenue in either the estimation period or the event period, the resulting measure of 
unexpected accruals does not reflect the impact of sales-based manipulation. In an 
attempt to capture earnings manipulation over revenue recognition, Dechow et al. 
(1995) modify the Jones procedure by subtracting the change in receivables (ΔREC) 




















kEXAC             (A2) 
Where ΔRECit is the change in accounts receivable between year t-1 and t for firm i. 
The coefficient estimates from equation (A1) are used as inputs of (A2) to estimate 
the expected accruals (EXACit) in (A2). Unexpected accruals (UEXAC) are thus 
defined as the difference between total accruals and the estimated expected accruals 
from (A2). 
 
A.2 The Dechow-Dichev (2002) model and the McNichols (2002)’s modifications 
The Dechow-Dichev approach is based on the intuition that accruals are temporary 
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adjustments that resolve timing problems in the underlying cash flows at the cost of 
making assumptions and estimates. Precise estimates imply a good match between 
current accruals and past, present, and future cash flow realizations, while imprecise 
or erroneous estimates reduce the beneficial role of accruals. Thus, Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) define accruals quality as the extent to which accruals map into cash 
flow realizations, and enumerate this notion of accruals quality as the standard 
deviation of the residuals from firm-specific regressions of working capital accruals 
on last-year, current, and one-year-ahead cash flows from operations. In particular, 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) estimate the following firm-level time-series regression: 
ti,1+ti,3ti,21-ti,10ti,  +CFOβ + CFOβ +CFOβ +β=WC εΔ                (A3) 
where ∆WC is the change in working capital from year t-1 to year t. All variables in 
the model are deflated by average total assets. The residuals from equation (A3) can 
be considered as unexpected accruals. 
 
One important feature of the Dechow-Dichev approach is that the notion of accruals 
estimation errors includes both intentional and unintentional errors. Intentional 
estimation error arises from incentives to manage earnings, while unintentional error 
arises from management lapses and environmental uncertainty. However, the 
Dechow-Dichev measure of unexpected accruals is affected by the measurement error 
in accruals, regardless of management intent. McNichols (2002) links Dechow and 
Dichev (2002)’s framework to the Jones-type approach, by modelling intentional 
estimation error arises from incentives to manage earnings. In particular, the 
McNichols (2002)’s modification of the Dechow-Dichev model is as follows:   
ti,ti,5ti,41+ti,3ti,21-ti,10ti,  +PPEβ +REVβ +CFOβ + CFOβ +CFOβ +β=WC εΔΔ   (A4) 
All variables are deflated by average total assets, and the residuals from the estimated 
model are used as a measure of unexpected accrual. McNichols (2002) demonstrates 
that including sales in the Dechow-Dichev model provides a better measure of 
unexpected accruals with controlling for measurement error in cash flow variables, 
and provide evidence on the validity of the modification.  
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A.3 Controlling for firm performance 
Kothari et al. (2005) argue that accruals of firms that have experienced unusual 
performance are expected to be systematically non-zero and therefore, firm 
performance is correlated with total and unexpected accruals. Kothari et al. (2005) 
thus propose two ways to control for firm performance in estimating unexpected 
accruals. The first approach uses performance variables, such as return-on-asset 
(ROA), as an additional independent variable in the modified Jones model. Therefore, 































)(1     (A5) 
where all variables are the same as defined before. 
 
The alternative approach Kothari et al. (2005) propose is based on a 
performance-matched procedure. unexpected accruals matched on firm performance 
can be calculated by first matching the firm-year observation of the sample firm with 
the firm-year observation for the control firm with the closest ROA and from the same 
industry group. Then, unexpected current accruals for each of the sample firms are 
estimated as well as the matched firms. Abnormal current accruals are thus defined as 
the difference between the unexpected current accruals of the sample firm and the 
unexpected current accruals of its matched firm. Specially, the performance-matched 
approach for unexpected accruals can be written as: 
jt UEXAC-  ' itit UEXACUEXAC = .                        (A6) 
where UEXACi and UEXACj are unexpected accruals of the sample firm i and the 
control firm j estimated from the modified Jones model. UEXAC’ is the measure of 
the performance-matched unexpected accruals. Kothari et al. (2005) find that matching 
based on the current year ROA performs better than matching on the prior year ROA and 
the performance-matched approach is superior to the way by including ROA in the 
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Table 1: The number of observations with various filters 
 
This Table reconciles the number of observations in the final sample with the data sources and the 
various filters. 
 
Step Filters Number of 
observations 
   
1 Firm-year observations on COMPUSTAT for 1987 to 2006 456,944 
   
2 Firm-year observations after deleting primary industry classification from 
the banking, life insurance, or property and casualty insurance industries 
349,377 
   
3 Firm-year observations with non-missing book value of assets greater than 
or equal to $1 million dollars 
141,121 
   
4 Firm-year observations after deleting observations with missing values for 
sales, total assets, or net income before extraordinary items 
136,095 
   
5 Firm-year observations after eliminating observations with an absolute 
value of external financing, external equity financing, or external debt 
financing greater than 1 
133,242 
   
6 Firm-year observations after eliminating observations with an absolute 
value of total accruals or current accruals greater than 1 
131,778 
 ３８
Table 2: Variable Measurement 
 
   
Variable Measurement (#Compustat item numbers) 
   
Panel A: Accruals and other variables 
Total accruals (TACC)  Total accruals / average total assets (#6). Total accruals, defined as 
income before extraordinary items (#123) minus cash from 
operations (CFO, data 308) divided by average total assets. 
Current accruals (CACC)  Current accruals / average total assets. Current accruals, defined as 
the increase in account receivables (#302) plus the increase in 
inventory (#303) minus the increase in account payable (#304)
minus the increase in tax payable (#305) minus the net change in
other current assets (#307). That is, CACC = - (#302 + #303 + #304 
+ #305 + #307) / average total assets. 
Net debt financing (ΔDebt)  The cash proceeds from the issuance of long-term debt (#111) less 
cash payments for long-term debt reduction (#114) less the net 
changes in current debt (#301) divided by average total assets. 
Net equity financing (ΔEquity)  The proceeds from the sale of common and preferred stock (#108)
less cash payments for the purchase of common and preferred stock
(#115) less cash payments for dividends (#127) divided by average 
total assets. 
Net external financing (ΔXFIN)  The sum of net debt financing and net equity financing. 
Change in cash balance (ΔCASH)   The change in the balance of cash and short-term investment (#274) 
divided by average total assets. 
Net income (INCOME)  Income before extraordinary items (#123) divided by average total 
assets. 
Change in net operating assets
(DNOA) 
 The change in net operating assets (NOA) divided by average total 
assets. Net operating asset (NOA) = noncash assets (#6 - #1) minus 
noncash liabilities (#181 - #9 - #34). 
Change in net current operating
assets (DCO) 
 The change in net current operating assets divided by average total
assets. Net current operating assets = current operating assets (COA)
– current operating liabilities (COL), where COA = current assets 
(#4) – cash and shot term investment (#1). COL = current liabilities 
(#5) – debt in current liabilities (#34). 
Change in net non-current operating
assets (DNCO) 
 The change in net non-current operating assets divided by average 
total assets. Net non-current operating assets = non-current 
operating assets (NCOA) – non-current operating liabilities 
(NCOL), where NCOA = total assets (#6) – current assets (#4) –
 ３９
investments and advances (#32). NCOL = total liabilities (#181) –
current liabilities (#5) – long-term debt (#9). 
PARTΔXFIN>Q3  The dummy variable taking value of 1 when the firm’s ΔXFIN is 
higher than the 75th percentile of the distribution in the 
corresponding year, and zero otherwise. 
PARTΔXFIN<Q1  The dummy variable taking value of 1 when the firm’s ΔXFIN is 
lower than the 25th percentile of the distribution in the corresponding 
year, and zero otherwise 
   
Panel B: Determinants of fundamental accruals variability 
UEXAC_MJT  Unexpected accruals from the modified Jones model for total 
accruals (TACC). 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA  Unexpected accruals from the modified Jones model with ROA as 
an additional regressor for total accruals (TACC). 
UEXAC_PMJT  Performance-matched unexpected accruals based on the modified 
Jones model for total accruals (TACC), as in Kothari et al. (2005). 
UEXAC_MJC  Unexpected accruals from the modified Jones model for current 
accruals (CACC). 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA  Unexpected accruals from the modified Jones model with ROA as 
an additional regressor for current accruals (CACC). 
UEXAC_PMJC  Performance-matched unexpected accruals based on the modified 
Jones model for current accruals (CACC), as in Kothari et al.
(2005). 
UEXAC_DD  Unexpected accruals from the Dechow-Dichev model. 
UEXAC_DDM  Unexpected accruals from the McNichols (2000)’s modification of 




Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 
This Table presents the summary statistics of accruals measures, external financing variables and other 
variables. The measurement of all variables can be found in Table 2. All variables are deflated by 
average total assets and reported in percentage. The number of observations is 131,778.  
 
Variables MEAN STD Lower Quartile MEDIAN Upper Quartile 
Panel A: Accruals, external financing and decomposition       
TACC -6.61 11.95 -10.79 -5.28 -0.80 
CACC 1.38 8.73 -2.35 0.88 5.06 
ΔXFIN 4.34 16.55 -4.03 0.00 7.02 
ΔDEBT 1.37 10.30 -2.58 0.00 3.75 
ΔEQUITY 2.97 12.63 -1.54 0.00 0.85 
ΔCASH 0.69 10.22 -1.99 0.07 2.87 
NI -2.52 18.62 -4.88 2.81 7.07 
DNOA 4.89 20.05 -4.18 3.22 13.14 
DCO 0.87 9.16 -2.83 0.56 4.67 
DNCO 4.02 15.30 -2.40 1.58 7.97 
      
Panel B: Unexpected accruals without control for ΔXFIN  
UEXAC_MJT 0.00 10.52 -3.74 0.80 5.15 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 0.00 8.76 -3.91 0.22 4.22 
UEXAC_PMJT -0.02 12.85 -6.29 0.00 6.29 
UEXAC_MJC 0.00 7.87 -3.52 -0.09 3.50 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 0.00 7.44 -3.49 -0.21 3.34 
UEXAC_PMJC 0.00 10.72 -5.39 0.00 5.43 
UEXAC_DD 0.00 6.93 -2.94 -0.05 3.02 
UEXAC_DDM 0.00 6.05 -2.55 0.06 2.74 
      
Panel C: Unexpected accruals matched on ΔXFIN 
UEXAC_MJT -0.02 14.33 -6.66 0.00 6.63 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA -0.03 11.54 -5.84 0.00 5.77 
UEXAC_MJC -0.01 10.62 -5.28 0.00 5.28 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA -0.01 9.88 -5.00 0.00 4.99 
UEXAC_DD -0.05 9.51 -4.52 -0.01 4.45 
UEXAC_DDM -0.05 8.40 -4.07 0.00 4.00 
      
Panel D: Unexpected accruals with ΔXFIN as an additional regressor 
UEXAC_MJT 0.00 10.04 -3.57 0.76 4.92 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 0.00 8.00 -3.63 0.27 3.99 
UEXAC_PMJT -0.07 12.19 -6.03 0.00 5.92 
UEXAC_MJC 0.00 7.41 -3.27 0.01 3.38 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 0.00 6.84 -3.21 -0.06 3.17 
UEXAC_PMJC 0.00 10.03 -5.05 0.00 5.11 
UEXAC_DD 0.00 6.61 -2.79 0.01 2.89 
UEXAC_DDM 0.00 5.80 -2.44 0.06 2.61 
 
TACC is total accruals, defined as income before extraordinary items (#123) minus cash from 
operations (CFO, data 308). CACC is current accruals, defined as the increase in account receivables 
(#302) plus the increase in inventory (#303) minus the increase in account payable (#304) minus the 
increase in tax payable (#305) minus the net change in other current assets (#307). ΔDEBT is net debt 
financing measured as the cash proceeds from the issuance of long-term debt (#111) less cash payments 
for long-term debt reduction (#114) less the net changes in current debt (#301). ΔEQUITY is net equity 
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financing measured as the proceeds from the sale of common and preferred stock (#108) less cash 
payments for the purchase of common and preferred stock (#115) less cash payments for dividends 
(#127). ΔXFIN is net external financing, defined as the sum of net debt financing and net equity 
financing. ΔCASH is the change in the balance of cash and short-term investment (#274). NI is income 
before extraordinary items (#123). DNOA is the change in net operating assets (NOA), defined as 
noncash assets (#6 - #1) minus noncash liabilities (#181 - #9 - #34). DCO is the change in net current 
operating assets, where net current operating assets are equal to current operating assets (COA) minus 
current operating liabilities (COL). COA = current assets (#4) – cash and shot term investment (#1). 
COL = current liabilities (#5) – debt in current liabilities (#34). DNCO is the change in net non-current 
operating assets, where net non-current operating assets are defined as non-current operating assets 
(NCOA) minus non-current operating liabilities (NCOL). NCOA = total assets (#6) – current assets (#4) 
– investments and advances (#32). NCOL = total liabilities (#181) – current liabilities (#5) – long-term 
debt (#9). UEXAC_MJT is unexpected accruals from the modified Jones model for total accruals 
(TACC). UEXAC_MJT_ROA is unexpected accruals from the modified Jones model with ROA as an 
additional regressor for total accruals (TACC). UEXAC_PMJT is performance-matched unexpected 
accruals based on the modified Jones model for total accruals (TACC), as in Kothari et al. (2005). 
UEXAC_MJC is unexpected accruals from the modified Jones model for current accruals (CACC). 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA is unexpected accruals from the modified Jones model with ROA as an additional 
regressor for current accruals (CACC). UEXAC_PMJC is performance-matched unexpected accruals 
based on the modified Jones model for current accruals (CACC), as in Kothari et al. (2005). 
UEXAC_DD is unexpected accruals from the Dechow-Dichev model. UEXAC_DDM is unexpected 
accruals from McNichols (2000)’s modification of the Dechow-Dichev model. 
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Table 4: Correlation Matrix 
Spearman and Pearson correlations are reported above and below the diagonal, respectively. The measurement of all variables can be found in Table 2. The number of observations is 
131,778.  
 
Variables Tacc Cacc ΔXFIN ΔDebt ΔEquity ΔCash NI DNOA DCO DNCO MJT 
MJT 
_ROA PMJT DD DDM MJT 
MJT 
_ROA PMJT DD DDM MJT 
MJT 
_ROA DD DDM 
TACC — 0.71 0.14 0.14 -0.01 -0.06 0.38 0.47 0.62 0.20 0.84 0.72 0.51 0.54 0.46 0.81 0.66 0.49 0.52 0.44 0.56 0.49 0.36 0.31 
CACC 0.69 — 0.22 0.16 0.09 -0.09 0.25 0.52 0.76 0.17 0.64 0.60 0.41 0.78 0.68 0.62 0.54 0.39 0.74 0.65 0.42 0.39 0.51 0.46 
ΔXFIN 0.06 0.17 — 0.66 0.53 0.10 -0.19 0.43 0.23 0.35 0.13 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
ΔDEBT 0.08 0.13 0.55 — -0.05 -0.03 -0.04 0.36 0.18 0.31 0.13 0.20 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.01 
ΔEQUITY 0.00 0.10 0.70 -0.05 — 0.10 -0.25 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.00 0.09 0.06 0.08 0.02 -0.03 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.01 -0.05 -0.03 0.00 -0.01 
ΔCASH -0.01 -0.06 0.20 -0.01 0.25 — 0.18 -0.08 -0.10 -0.02 -0.09 -0.17 -0.11 0.00 -0.03 -0.10 -0.25 -0.13 -0.04 -0.04 -0.07 -0.15 0.00 -0.02 
NI 0.51 0.24 -0.24 -0.06 -0.22 0.17 — 0.33 0.25 0.27 0.28 -0.05 0.00 0.35 0.26 0.28 -0.06 0.01 0.34 0.26 0.23 0.02 0.27 0.19 
DNOA 0.44 0.46 0.41 0.36 0.19 -0.03 0.28 — 0.58 0.77 0.41 0.35 0.23 0.44 0.31 0.38 0.23 0.21 0.39 0.29 0.26 0.18 0.27 0.20 
DCO 0.59 0.75 0.18 0.15 0.10 -0.07 0.25 0.53 — 0.15 0.54 0.48 0.33 0.60 0.48 0.52 0.42 0.32 0.56 0.46 0.34 0.30 0.39 0.32 
DNCO 0.18 0.12 0.37 0.33 0.16 0.00 0.18 0.80 0.12 — 0.15 0.11 0.06 0.17 0.06 0.13 0.01 0.04 0.13 0.06 0.09 0.02 0.09 0.03 
                        
Without control for XFIN                        
UEXAC_MJT 0.91 0.63 0.06 0.07 0.00 -0.04 0.43 0.39 0.53 0.15 — 0.83 0.60 0.51 0.53 0.96 0.76 0.59 0.50 0.50 0.65 0.57 0.34 0.35 
UEXAC_MJT 
_ROA 0.78 0.63 0.21 0.16 0.11 -0.14 0.05 0.35 0.51 0.13 0.85 — 0.63 0.40 0.40 0.81 0.92 0.61 0.39 0.38 0.55 0.64 0.25 0.26 
UEXAC_PMJT 0.55 0.43 0.14 0.10 0.08 -0.09 0.02 0.23 0.34 0.07 0.63 0.67 — 0.27 0.30 0.58 0.57 0.88 0.27 0.29 0.42 0.42 0.17 0.21 
UEXAC_DD 0.57 0.83 0.11 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.36 0.40 0.63 0.13 0.54 0.45 0.29 — 0.85 0.50 0.35 0.27 0.95 0.81 0.33 0.26 0.65 0.56 
UEXAC_DDM 0.49 0.74 0.05 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.31 0.27 0.51 0.03 0.54 0.43 0.30 0.89 — 0.52 0.35 0.29 0.82 0.96 0.35 0.27 0.57 0.67 
                       
Control for XFIN: Regressed on XFIN 
UEXAC_MJT 0.89 0.61 0.00 0.05 -0.03 -0.06 0.45 0.38 0.52 0.14 0.98 0.84 0.61 0.53 0.54 — 0.79 0.60 0.51 0.51 0.66 0.57 0.34 0.36 
UEXAC_MJT 
_ROA 0.72 0.57 0.00 0.04 -0.02 -0.25 0.04 0.24 0.44 0.03 0.79 0.94 0.62 0.40 0.38 0.81 — 0.60 0.39 0.35 0.53 0.65 0.25 0.24 
UEXAC_PMJT 0.53 0.41 0.12 0.08 0.07 -0.12 0.03 0.21 0.33 0.05 0.61 0.66 0.88 0.28 0.30 0.62 0.65 — 0.27 0.29 0.42 0.43 0.18 0.21 
UEXAC_DD 0.56 0.80 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.37 0.36 0.61 0.09 0.53 0.44 0.28 0.97 0.87 0.54 0.43 0.29 — 0.85 0.34 0.28 0.65 0.57 
UEXAC_DDM 0.48 0.72 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.31 0.26 0.50 0.02 0.53 0.42 0.30 0.86 0.97 0.53 0.39 0.30 0.89 — 0.34 0.27 0.56 0.65 
                       
Control for XFIN: Matched on XFIN 
UEXAC_MJT 0.63 0.43 0.00 0.02 -0.02 -0.04 0.32 0.26 0.35 0.09 0.70 0.59 0.44 0.36 0.37 0.71 0.57 0.44 0.37 0.37 — 0.84 0.36 0.38 
UEXAC_MJT 
_ROA 0.55 0.42 0.00 0.01 -0.01 -0.15 0.10 0.18 0.32 0.03 0.61 0.68 0.46 0.29 0.30 0.61 0.69 0.47 0.31 0.30 0.86 — 0.28 0.30 
UEXAC_DD 0.40 0.57 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.29 0.26 0.43 0.06 0.37 0.28 0.18 0.70 0.62 0.37 0.28 0.19 0.70 0.62 0.38 0.30 — 0.84 




Table 5: Sorting Analysis 
 
This Table reports the averages of unexpected accruals measures, external financing variables and other 
variables for the quartiles sorted on ΔXFIN within each year, where quartile 1 (quartile 4) represents 
the lowest (highest) quartile. The measurement of all variables can be found in Table 2. All variables 
are deflated by average total assets and reported in percentage. The number of observations is 131,778. 
 
Variables Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4 
Panel A: Accruals, external financing and decomposition 
TACC -7.94 -6.34 -5.73 -5.30 
CACC 0.05 0.64 1.87 3.86 
ΔXFIN -9.66 -1.75 2.77 25.99 
ΔDEBT -3.51 -0.91 2.10 10.43 
ΔEQUITY -1.45 -0.74 0.86 13.46 
ΔCASH 0.59 -0.21 -0.33 2.83 
NI -1.31 -0.12 -2.10 -7.50 
DNOA 0.78 1.18 4.80 17.27 
DCO -0.56 0.27 1.39 3.65 
DNCO 1.51 1.04 3.31 12.31 
     
Panel B: Unexpected accruals without control for ΔXFIN 
UEXAC_MJT -1.08 0.17 0.62 1.21 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA -1.40 -0.48 0.46 2.69 
UEXAC_PMJT -1.36 -0.58 0.34 2.72 
UEXAC_MJC -1.13 -0.48 0.46 1.91 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA -1.26 -0.70 0.39 2.42 
UEXAC_PMJC -1.30 -0.60 0.47 2.34 
UEXAC_DD -0.62 -0.55 0.28 1.33 
UEXAC_DDM -0.34 -0.12 0.25 0.45 
     
Panel C: Unexpected accruals matched on ΔXFIN 
UEXAC_MJT -0.02 -0.02 0.03 -0.06 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.03 
UEXAC_MJC -0.07 -0.03 0.08 -0.02 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA -0.07 0.01 0.03 -0.01 
UEXAC_DD -0.05 -0.07 -0.05 -0.02 
UEXAC_DDM -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.05 
     
Panel D: Unexpected accruals with ΔXFIN as an additional regressor 
UEXAC_MJT -0.86 0.19 0.41 0.26 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA -0.98 0.17 0.64 0.18 
UEXAC_PMJT -2.02 -0.44 0.27 2.04 
UEXAC_MJC -0.80 -0.10 0.47 0.36 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA -0.82 -0.11 0.54 0.33 
UEXAC_PMJC -1.32 -0.27 0.51 0.99 
UEXAC_DD -0.44 -0.25 0.37 0.30 




Table 6: Bias in Testing Earnings Management in the Presence of External 
Financing 
 
This Table empirically estimates the bias in tests of earnings management (i.e., the bias in regression 
coefficients, ρPART, η * ση / σPART) in the presence of large external financing, by applying the framework 
as suggested by McNichols and Wilson (1988). The measurement of all variables can be found in Table 
2. All variables are deflated by average total assets and reported in percentage. The number of 
observations is 131,778. PARTΔXFIN>Q3 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if when the firm’s ΔXFIN is 
higher than the 75th percentile of the distribution in the corresponding year, and zero otherwise. 
PARTΔXFIN<Q1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if when the firm’s ΔXFIN is lower than the 25th 
percentile of the distribution in the corresponding year, and zero otherwise. η is measured as the 
difference between unexpected accruals estimated from models without and with controlling for 
ΔXFIN. 
 
Unexpected accruals Bias(PARTΔXFIN>Q3) Bias(PARTΔXFIN<Q1) 
Panel A: Unexpected accruals matched on ΔXFIN as the true model 
UEXAC_MJT 1.41 -1.73 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 3.53 -3.14 
UEXAC_MJC 2.58 -2.15 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 3.30 -2.60 
UEXAC_DD 1.74 -1.23 
UEXAC_DDM 0.53 -0.51 
   
Panel B: Unexpected accruals with ΔXFIN as an additional regressor as the true model 
UEXAC_MJT 1.03 -0.73 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 3.31 -2.00 
UEXAC_PMJT 0.89 -0.67 
UEXAC_MJC 2.07 -1.32 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 2.88 -1.75 
UEXAC_PMJC 1.83 -1.20 
UEXAC_DD 1.39 -0.74 




Table 7: Regression of Unexpected Accruals on External Financing Indicators 
 
This Table reports results on regressing unexpected accruals on external financing indicators: UEXAC 
= α + β * PART + ε. The measurement of all variables can be found in Table 2. All variables are 
deflated by average total assets and reported in percentage. The number of observations is 131,778. 
PARTΔXFIN>Q3 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if when the firm’s ΔXFIN is higher than the 75th 
percentile of the distribution in the corresponding year, and zero otherwise. PARTΔXFIN<Q1 is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if when the firm’s ΔXFIN is lower than the 25th percentile of the 
distribution in the corresponding year, and zero otherwise. ** (*) indicates significant at the 1% (5%) 
level for two tailed test. 
 
Dependent variables PARTΔXFIN>Q3 T-stat PARTΔXFIN<Q1 T-stat 
Panel A: Unexpected accruals without control for ΔXFIN 
UEXAC_MJT 1.68 4.8** -2.17 -10.3** 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 3.62 13.9** -3.61 -21.8** 
UEXAC_PMJT 3.70 10.8** -3.50 -15.6** 
UEXAC_MJC 2.66 11.1** -2.56 -12.7** 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 3.17 12.3** -2.97 -14.6** 
UEXAC_PMJC 3.24 10.3** -3.08 -13.9** 
UEXAC_DD 1.71 9.3** -1.31 -9.4** 
UEXAC_DDM 0.63 4.7** -0.62 -6.7** 
     
Panel B: Unexpected accruals matched on ΔXFIN 
UEXAC_MJT 0.08 0.3 -0.21 -1.6 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA -0.04 -0.2 -0.05 -0.3 
UEXAC_MJC 0.27 1.5 -0.12 -1.1 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 0.06 0.5 -0.02 -0.1 
UEXAC_DD -0.05 -0.5 0.18 1.4 
UEXAC_DDM 0.10 1.2 0.01 0.1 
     
Panel C: Unexpected accruals with ΔXFIN as an additional regressor 
UEXAC_MJT 0.66 3.0** -1.35 -10.1** 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 0.33 2.3* -1.39 -8.7** 
UEXAC_PMJT 2.95 12.1** -2.75 -8.7** 
UEXAC_MJC 0.79 6.9** -1.19 -11.6** 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 0.51 5.6** -1.10 -11.6** 
UEXAC_PMJC 1.78 6.0** -1.82 -13.0** 
UEXAC_DD 0.53 5.9** -0.55 -6.7** 
UEXAC_DDM 0.37 4.0** -0.44 -7.8** 
 ４６
Table 8: Bias in Testing Earnings Management as the percent of the sample 
contaminated by external financing 
 
This Table empirically estimates the bias in tests of earnings management in the presence of large 
external financing, by applying the framework as suggested by McNichols and Wilson (1988). Panel A 
and B report the bias in regression coefficients (i.e. ρPART, η * ση / σPART). Panel C and D report the 
difference between unexpected accruals estimated from models with and without a control for ΔXFIN 
(i.e. η). The sample is contaminated at the X% level by taking a random sample of 1,000∗X% without 
replacement from the subsample of firm-years with large external financing (PARTΔXFIN>Q3=1 or 
PARTΔXFIN<Q1=1) and a random sample of 1,000∗(100%–X%) without replacement from the subsample 
of firm-years without large external financing (PARTΔXFIN>Q3=0 and PARTΔXFIN<Q1=0). The 
measurement of all variables can be found in Table 2. All variables are deflated by average total assets 
and reported in percentage. The number of observations is 131,778. PARTΔXFIN>Q3 is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if when the firm’s ΔXFIN is higher than the 75th percentile of the distribution in the 
corresponding year, and zero otherwise. PARTΔXFIN<Q1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if when the 
firm’s ΔXFIN is lower than the 25th percentile of the distribution in the corresponding year, and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Contamination level (X)  10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% Average 
Panel A1: Bias when unexpected accruals matched on ΔXFIN is the true model (PARTΔXFIN>Q3) 
UEXAC_MJT  0.92 0.90 0.93 0.84 0.84 0.88 0.90 0.90 0.91 0.89 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA  2.74 2.72 2.73 2.71 2.73 2.69 2.69 2.68 2.70 2.71 
UEXAC_MJC  2.03 2.02 1.97 1.97 1.96 1.98 1.99 2.00 1.96 1.99 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA  2.58 2.58 2.60 2.60 2.59 2.59 2.58 2.56 2.53 2.58 
UEXAC_DD  1.39 1.42 1.42 1.40 1.39 1.38 1.39 1.41 1.34 1.39 
UEXAC_DDM  0.40 0.39 0.38 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.38 0.37 0.32 0.38 
Panel A2: Bias when unexpected accruals matched on ΔXFIN is the true model (PARTΔXFIN<Q1) 
UEXAC_MJT  -1.67 -1.66 -1.66 -1.66 -1.69 -1.63 -1.62 -1.64 -1.62 -1.65 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA  -2.62 -2.64 -2.64 -2.66 -2.66 -2.69 -2.70 -2.71 -2.70 -2.67 
UEXAC_MJC  -1.88 -1.84 -1.86 -1.84 -1.85 -1.85 -1.84 -1.81 -1.87 -1.85 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA  -2.18 -2.21 -2.20 -2.18 -2.18 -2.18 -2.18 -2.20 -2.22 -2.19 
UEXAC_DD  -0.99 -0.97 -0.99 -1.00 -1.01 -0.99 -0.99 -0.97 -1.05 -1.00 
UEXAC_DDM  -0.47 -0.44 -0.45 -0.46 -0.47 -0.47 -0.49 -0.50 -0.55 -0.48 
Panel B1: Bias when unexpected accruals with ΔXFIN as an additional regressor is the true model (PARTΔXFIN>Q3) 
UEXAC_MJT  0.85 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.87 0.86 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA  2.90 2.90 2.89 2.89 2.90 2.88 2.89 2.89 2.90 2.89 
UEXAC_PMJT  0.74 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.68 0.72 0.69 
UEXAC_MJC  1.73 1.76 1.75 1.75 1.76 1.75 1.75 1.75 1.74 1.75 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA  2.44 2.46 2.45 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.46 2.45 2.46 
UEXAC_PMJC  1.52 1.54 1.51 1.53 1.56 1.56 1.56 1.56 1.54 1.54 
UEXAC_DD  1.24 1.23 1.23 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 
UEXAC_DDM  0.26 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.28 0.27 0.27 
Panel B2: Bias when unexpected accruals with ΔXFIN as an additional regressor is the true model (PARTΔXFIN<Q1) 
UEXAC_MJT  -0.57 -0.56 -0.56 -0.56 -0.56 -0.56 -0.55 -0.55 -0.56 -0.56 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA  -1.36 -1.36 -1.37 -1.37 -1.36 -1.37 -1.37 -1.37 -1.35 -1.36 
UEXAC_PMJT  -0.54 -0.52 -0.52 -0.54 -0.54 -0.55 -0.55 -0.57 -0.53 -0.54 
UEXAC_MJC  -0.93 -0.94 -0.93 -0.93 -0.93 -0.93 -0.94 -0.94 -0.95 -0.94 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA  -1.23 -1.22 -1.21 -1.22 -1.22 -1.22 -1.22 -1.22 -1.23 -1.22 
UEXAC_PMJC  -0.91 -0.89 -0.89 -0.90 -0.89 -0.87 -0.88 -0.88 -0.89 -0.89 
UEXAC_DD  -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.45 -0.46 -0.45 
UEXAC_DDM  -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 
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Panel C1: Difference between unexpected accruals without controlling for ΔXFIN and matched on ΔXFIN (PARTΔXFIN>Q3) 
UEXAC_MJT  0.47 0.57 0.65 0.73 0.82 0.89 0.97 1.07 1.16  
UEXAC_MJT_ROA  0.27 0.54 0.81 1.08 1.35 1.62 1.90 2.17 2.43  
UEXAC_MJC  -0.03 0.17 0.37 0.56 0.75 0.96 1.16 1.36 1.55  
UEXAC_MJC_ROA  0.06 0.32 0.59 0.86 1.12 1.38 1.64 1.91 2.16  
UEXAC_DD  0.07 0.22 0.36 0.50 0.65 0.77 0.92 1.06 1.21  
UEXAC_DDM  0.14 0.18 0.22 0.26 0.30 0.35 0.41 0.45 0.49  
Panel C2: Difference between unexpected accruals without controlling for ΔXFIN and matched on ΔXFIN (PARTΔXFIN<Q1) 
UEXAC_MJT  0.21 0.05 -0.12 -0.27 -0.44 -0.62 -0.80 -0.96 -1.12  
UEXAC_MJT_ROA  -0.26 -0.53 -0.80 -1.07 -1.35 -1.61 -1.87 -2.14 -2.42  
UEXAC_MJC  -0.22 -0.40 -0.59 -0.77 -0.95 -1.14 -1.32 -1.50 -1.68  
UEXAC_MJC_ROA  -0.42 -0.63 -0.84 -1.05 -1.27 -1.48 -1.69 -1.90 -2.11  
UEXAC_DD  -0.16 -0.26 -0.37 -0.46 -0.56 -0.65 -0.74 -0.84 -0.93  
UEXAC_DDM  0.05 0.01 -0.03 -0.09 -0.12 -0.16 -0.20 -0.25 -0.29  
Panel D1: Difference between unexpected accruals without controlling for ΔXFIN and with ΔXFIN as an additional regressor 
(PARTΔXFIN>Q3) 
UEXAC_MJT  0.18 0.26 0.35 0.44 0.52 0.61 0.70 0.78 0.87  
UEXAC_MJT_ROA  -0.12 0.17 0.46 0.75 1.04 1.32 1.61 1.90 2.19  
UEXAC_PMJT  0.03 0.09 0.17 0.24 0.31 0.38 0.45 0.53 0.61  
UEXAC_MJC  -0.02 0.16 0.33 0.51 0.68 0.85 1.03 1.20 1.38  
UEXAC_MJC_ROA  -0.12 0.12 0.37 0.61 0.86 1.10 1.35 1.60 1.85  
UEXAC_PMJC  -0.04 0.11 0.26 0.42 0.57 0.73 0.88 1.04 1.19  
UEXAC_DD  -0.07 0.05 0.17 0.30 0.42 0.55 0.67 0.79 0.92  
UEXAC_DDM  0.04 0.06 0.09 0.12 0.14 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.26  
Panel D2: Difference between unexpected accruals without controlling for ΔXFIN and with ΔXFIN as an additional regressor 
(PARTΔXFIN<Q1) 
UEXAC_MJT  0.03 -0.02 -0.08 -0.13 -0.19 -0.24 -0.30 -0.35 -0.41  
UEXAC_MJT_ROA  -0.55 -0.68 -0.82 -0.96 -1.09 -1.23 -1.37 -1.50 -1.64  
UEXAC_PMJT  -0.10 -0.15 -0.20 -0.24 -0.30 -0.36 -0.41 -0.47 -0.52  
UEXAC_MJC  -0.29 -0.38 -0.48 -0.57 -0.66 -0.75 -0.85 -0.94 -1.04  
UEXAC_MJC_ROA  -0.49 -0.61 -0.73 -0.86 -0.98 -1.10 -1.22 -1.35 -1.47  
UEXAC_PMJC  -0.29 -0.37 -0.46 -0.56 -0.65 -0.73 -0.82 -0.91 -1.00  
UEXAC_DD  -0.24 -0.29 -0.33 -0.38 -0.42 -0.47 -0.51 -0.56 -0.61  
UEXAC_DDM  0.00 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.06 -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.12  
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Table 9: Rejection Frequencies as the percent of the sample contaminated by 
external financing (5% significance level) 
 
This Table reports empirical rejection frequencies for samples contaminated by external financing. The 
sample is contaminated at the X% level by taking a random sample of 1,000∗X% without replacement 
from the subsample of firm-years with large external financing (PARTΔXFIN>Q3=1 or PARTΔXFIN<Q1=1) 
and a random sample of 1,000∗(100%–X%) without replacement from the subsample of firm-years 
without large external financing (PARTΔXFIN>Q3=0 and PARTΔXFIN<Q1=0). PARTΔXFIN>Q3 is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if when the firm’s ΔXFIN is higher than the 75th percentile of the distribution in the 
corresponding year, and zero otherwise. PARTΔXFIN<Q1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if when the 
firm’s ΔXFIN is lower than the 25th percentile of the distribution in the corresponding year, and zero 
otherwise. The rejection frequencies thus represent the percentage of 250 trials where tests of earnings 
management is significant at the 5% or 1% level and, hence, represents the probability of committing a 
type I error when some firms in the sample involve in large net external financing if no earnings 
management is present. 
 
Contamination level 
(X) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
            
Panel A: Unexpected accruals without control for ΔXFIN (PARTΔXFIN>Q3) 
UEXAC_MJT 8.0% 36.0% 55.2% 63.2% 68.4% 75.2% 74.8% 79.2% 85.6% 88.8% 91.6% 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 3.6% 26.4% 66.4% 89.6% 99.2% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
UEXAC_PMJT 2.0% 11.2% 32.4% 59.6% 77.6% 92.0% 97.2% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
UEXAC_MJC 2.4% 18.4% 43.6% 71.6% 92.4% 96.8% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 2.0% 10.4% 48.4% 84.0% 97.6% 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
UEXAC_PMJC 3.6% 11.6% 33.6% 64.4% 86.0% 96.0% 98.8% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
UEXAC_DD 2.0% 10.8% 25.6% 40.4% 60.8% 82.4% 95.6% 99.2% 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 
UEXAC_DDM 7.2% 11.2% 22.8% 28.0% 33.6% 36.4% 42.8% 46.8% 51.2% 58.4% 66.8% 
            
Panel B: Unexpected accruals matched on ΔXFIN (PARTΔXFIN>Q3) 
UEXAC_MJT 6.4% 5.6% 4.4% 5.6% 6.0% 4.8% 3.6% 4.0% 4.4% 2.4% 2.4% 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 3.6% 4.4% 3.6% 5.2% 3.2% 4.8% 4.4% 2.8% 2.8% 2.0% 2.8% 
UEXAC_MJC 6.4% 4.8% 6.0% 6.4% 6.4% 5.6% 5.2% 5.2% 4.4% 4.8% 5.2% 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 5.2% 4.0% 4.4% 5.2% 2.8% 4.0% 3.6% 4.4% 3.2% 2.8% 2.0% 
UEXAC_DD 2.8% 3.2% 3.2% 4.8% 3.6% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 
UEXAC_DDM 2.0% 3.6% 4.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.8% 4.0% 2.4% 2.0% 3.6% 
            
Panel C: Unexpected accruals with ΔXFIN as an additional regressor (PARTΔXFIN>Q3) 
UEXAC_MJT 28.4% 25.6% 25.2% 26.0% 26.8% 24.0% 20.8% 17.2% 16.8% 16.8% 13.2% 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 44.8% 38.8% 32.0% 26.4% 22.0% 23.2% 20.0% 18.0% 19.6% 17.6% 14.8% 
UEXAC_PMJT 4.0% 10.4% 26.4% 43.2% 61.6% 79.6% 88.4% 93.2% 96.0% 99.2% 99.2% 
UEXAC_MJC 21.2% 23.6% 24.0% 26.0% 30.0% 29.6% 31.6% 33.2% 29.6% 30.8% 30.4% 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 26.4% 28.8% 29.2% 26.0% 25.6% 30.0% 31.6% 31.2% 32.8% 30.8% 33.6% 
UEXAC_PMJC 16.0% 22.0% 30.8% 38.4% 46.4% 53.2% 59.2% 66.0% 71.2% 80.0% 82.8% 
UEXAC_DD 8.8% 10.4% 12.0% 14.8% 17.6% 17.6% 21.2% 23.2% 26.0% 24.4% 29.2% 
UEXAC_DDM 8.8% 8.4% 10.4% 9.6% 11.6% 12.4% 13.2% 17.6% 19.2% 18.4% 20.8% 
            
Panel D: Unexpected accruals without control for ΔXFIN (PARTΔXFIN<Q1) 
UEXAC_MJT 2.0% 2.8% 4.0% 10.0% 19.6% 32.4% 49.6% 67.6% 82.0% 92.8% 96.0% 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 4.0% 15.2% 30.8% 54.4% 73.2% 88.0% 94.4% 98.0% 99.2% 100.0% 100.0% 
UEXAC_PMJT 5.6% 14.0% 22.4% 38.0% 47.2% 57.2% 68.8% 84.0% 89.6% 94.0% 95.6% 
UEXAC_MJC 4.8% 13.2% 27.6% 48.8% 65.6% 77.6% 89.2% 96.4% 97.6% 98.4% 99.2% 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 18.4% 34.0% 53.6% 74.4% 86.8% 92.4% 97.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
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UEXAC_PMJC 7.2% 14.4% 21.6% 38.0% 52.4% 68.8% 82.4% 90.8% 93.2% 96.8% 99.2% 
UEXAC_DD 20.8% 28.4% 36.4% 43.6% 55.6% 63.6% 70.8% 77.2% 80.4% 85.6% 89.2% 
UEXAC_DDM 2.0% 4.0% 6.8% 8.8% 13.6% 22.8% 30.8% 38.0% 44.0% 53.2% 60.4% 
            
Panel E: Unexpected accruals matched on ΔXFIN (PARTΔXFIN<Q1) 
UEXAC_MJT 3.6% 2.8% 3.6% 4.8% 6.4% 4.8% 4.4% 3.6% 5.2% 4.0% 5.2% 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 4.4% 5.2% 6.4% 6.8% 7.2% 6.0% 7.6% 5.2% 5.2% 4.8% 4.8% 
UEXAC_MJC 4.4% 5.2% 3.6% 5.6% 8.0% 7.6% 6.4% 7.6% 7.6% 8.0% 7.6% 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 4.4% 4.4% 4.4% 4.4% 4.8% 6.0% 6.8% 6.4% 6.0% 8.0% 7.6% 
UEXAC_DD 7.6% 6.0% 7.6% 8.0% 7.6% 7.2% 8.0% 6.8% 8.0% 7.2% 6.8% 
UEXAC_DDM 7.2% 7.2% 8.0% 7.2% 8.0% 7.6% 7.6% 7.6% 7.2% 8.0% 6.8% 
            
Panel F: Unexpected accruals with ΔXFIN as an additional regressor (PARTΔXFIN<Q1) 
UEXAC_MJT 0.8% 1.2% 2.8% 3.6% 10.0% 21.2% 32.8% 50.8% 71.2% 86.8% 93.2% 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 0.4% 1.2% 1.2% 8.8% 16.4% 38.0% 66.8% 84.0% 97.2% 100.0% 100.0% 
UEXAC_PMJT 4.8% 16.0% 32.8% 56.4% 75.2% 89.6% 96.8% 99.6% 99.6% 100.0% 100.0% 
UEXAC_MJC 0.4% 0.4% 3.6% 12.4% 27.2% 43.6% 64.0% 80.4% 88.8% 97.2% 99.2% 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 0.4% 0.4% 3.2% 13.6% 22.8% 43.6% 64.8% 81.6% 91.6% 98.8% 100.0% 
UEXAC_PMJC 0.8% 4.8% 13.6% 26.8% 48.8% 62.4% 80.4% 94.0% 98.0% 98.8% 99.6% 
UEXAC_DD 3.2% 4.0% 8.4% 11.6% 18.8% 26.0% 39.2% 48.0% 58.8% 70.4% 77.6% 
UEXAC_DDM 2.4% 4.4% 4.8% 8.4% 12.8% 16.0% 20.8% 27.6% 36.4% 49.2% 57.6% 
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Table 10: Rejection Frequencies as the percent of the sample contaminated by 
external financing (1% significance level) 
 
This Table reports empirical rejection frequencies for samples contaminated by external financing. The 
sample is contaminated at the X% level by taking a random sample of 1,000∗X% without replacement 
from the subsample of firm-years with large external financing (PARTΔXFIN>Q3=1 or PARTΔXFIN<Q1=1) 
and a random sample of 1,000∗(100%–X%) without replacement from the subsample of firm-years 
without large external financing (PARTΔXFIN>Q3=0 and PARTΔXFIN<Q1=0). PARTΔXFIN>Q3 is an indicator 
variable equal to 1 if when the firm’s ΔXFIN is higher than the 75th percentile of the distribution in the 
corresponding year, and zero otherwise. PARTΔXFIN<Q1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if when the 
firm’s ΔXFIN is lower than the 25th percentile of the distribution in the corresponding year, and zero 
otherwise. The rejection frequencies thus represent the percentage of 250 trials where tests of earnings 
management is significant at the 5% or 1% level and, hence, represents the probability of committing a 
type I error when some firms in the sample involve in large net external financing if no earnings 
management is present. 
 
Contamination level 
(X) 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% 
            
Panel A: Unexpected accruals without control for ΔXFIN (PARTΔXFIN>Q3) 
UEXAC_MJT 4.0% 21.2% 35.2% 40.2% 46.4% 50.4% 57.2% 64.0% 66.4% 72.0% 75.6% 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 0.8% 8.0% 41.6% 73.2% 92.4% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
UEXAC_PMJT 0.4% 2.4% 12.4% 29.2% 51.6% 75.6% 88.4% 96.0% 98.4% 100.0% 100.0% 
UEXAC_MJC 0.8% 5.2% 20.4% 46.8% 69.6% 88.4% 97.6% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 0.4% 2.8% 23.2% 64.0% 90.4% 98.4% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
UEXAC_PMJC 0.4% 3.6% 12.8% 37.6% 62.4% 84.8% 95.2% 98.4% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
UEXAC_DD 0.8% 4.4% 9.3% 19.6% 41.2% 56.0% 74.4% 92.4% 98.8% 100.0% 100.0% 
UEXAC_DDM 2.8% 4.4% 8.4% 12.0% 18.8% 22.4% 24.4% 26.4% 28.8% 30.0% 32.4% 
            
Panel B: Unexpected accruals matched on ΔXFIN (PARTΔXFIN>Q3) 
UEXAC_MJT 2.8% 2.4% 1.6% 2.4% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 1.2% 0.8% 0.8% 0.4% 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 1.2% 1.2% 0.8% 0.8% 0.4% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.4% 
UEXAC_MJC 0.4% 0.8% 0.4% 0.4% 0.8% 0.8% 0.4% 0.4% 1.2% 0.4% 0.8% 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 0.8% 1.2% 1.2% 0.4% 0.8% 0.4% 0.8% 1.2% 0.8% 0.4% 0.4% 
UEXAC_DD 0.4% 0.8% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 
UEXAC_DDM 0.4% 0.8% 0.4% 0.8% 0.8% 0.4% 0.4% 0.8% 0.4% 1.2% 1.2% 
            
Panel C: Unexpected accruals with ΔXFIN as an additional regressor (PARTΔXFIN>Q3) 
UEXAC_MJT 11.6% 8.8% 9.6% 11.2% 8.4% 8.4% 6.8% 8.0% 6.0% 5.6% 4.4% 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 23.6% 20.4% 15.2% 11.6% 6.4% 4.8% 5.2% 5.6% 4.4% 3.6% 3.6% 
UEXAC_PMJT 0.8% 1.6% 9.6% 22.4% 33.2% 54.4% 70.0% 82.4% 90.8% 93.6% 98.0% 
UEXAC_MJC 5.6% 7.2% 8.0% 12.4% 13.6% 16.0% 12.4% 12.4% 13.2% 14.4% 15.6% 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 8.8% 8.0% 6.8% 8.0% 6.0% 10.8% 9.6% 13.6% 12.0% 11.2% 11.6% 
UEXAC_PMJC 4.0% 8.4% 10.4% 16.4% 23.6% 32.0% 36.8% 38.8% 45.6% 55.6% 64.4% 
UEXAC_DD 1.2% 2.8% 2.8% 4.0% 5.2% 4.8% 8.0% 9.2% 8.8% 8.8% 9.2% 
UEXAC_DDM 1.6% 2.4% 3.6% 3.6% 4.4% 4.8% 4.0% 4.0% 6.8% 4.4% 6.4% 
            
Panel D: Unexpected accruals without control for ΔXFIN (PARTΔXFIN<Q1) 
UEXAC_MJT 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 2.4% 4.0% 13.2% 24.0% 38.0% 59.2% 74.4% 86.8% 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 0.8% 3.2% 11.2% 25.6% 48.0% 67.2% 85.2% 92.8% 97.6% 99.2% 100.0% 
UEXAC_PMJT 2.0% 4.4% 8.0% 16.4% 28.8% 37.2% 49.2% 56.8% 69.2% 82.4% 88.4% 
UEXAC_MJC 0.8% 2.8% 9.2% 20.8% 36.4% 52.0% 70.8% 85.2% 94.4% 95.6% 97.2% 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 5.2% 11.6% 26.4% 49.2% 64.4% 78.4% 90.4% 96.0% 98.8% 100.0% 100.0% 
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UEXAC_PMJC 1.2% 3.2% 9.2% 11.2% 22.8% 39.2% 55.2% 73.6% 82.8% 87.2% 94.4% 
UEXAC_DD 7.2% 9.2% 15.2% 21.2% 26.0% 37.2% 47.6% 52.4% 58.4% 64.0% 73.2% 
UEXAC_DDM 0.4% 0.4% 1.2% 1.6% 3.2% 6.4% 9.6% 16.4% 20.0% 26.8% 31.2% 
            
Panel E: Unexpected accruals matched on ΔXFIN (PARTΔXFIN<Q1) 
UEXAC_MJT 0.4% 1.2% 1.2% 1.6% 2.0% 1.6% 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 1.6% 1.2% 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 0.8% 1.6% 0.8% 2.4% 1.2% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 0.8% 
UEXAC_MJC 1.6% 2.0% 1.6% 1.2% 2.0% 1.2% 1.6% 2.0% 2.0% 1.2% 1.6% 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 0.4% 0.8% 0.8% 1.2% 1.2% 1.6% 1.2% 1.6% 2.0% 0.4% 2.4% 
UEXAC_DD 2.8% 2.0% 1.6% 2.8% 1.6% 1.6% 2.0% 0.8% 1.6% 1.6% 1.6% 
UEXAC_DDM 1.6% 2.4% 2.4% 2.4% 2.8% 2.0% 1.2% 2.8% 2.4% 0.8% 1.6% 
            
Panel F: Unexpected accruals with ΔXFIN as an additional regressor (PARTΔXFIN<Q1) 
UEXAC_MJT 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 1.2% 3.2% 6.0% 14.0% 24.0% 45.2% 63.2% 80.0% 
UEXAC_MJT_ROA 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 5.6% 14.8% 34.4% 62.0% 83.2% 96.0% 99.6% 
UEXAC_PMJT 1.2% 4.8% 12.0% 33.6% 56.4% 75.2% 90.0% 96.4% 98.8% 99.6% 100.0% 
UEXAC_MJC 0.4% 0.8% 0.8% 2.4% 7.2% 19.2% 34.4% 54.8% 74.0% 86.4% 97.6% 
UEXAC_MJC_ROA 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 3.2% 9.2% 16.8% 36.4% 58.8% 76.8% 93.2% 98.0% 
UEXAC_PMJC 0.8% 0.8% 3.6% 10.4% 24.0% 40.8% 58.4% 77.2% 91.2% 96.8% 98.8% 
UEXAC_DD 0.4% 1.2% 1.6% 4.0% 6.4% 8.8% 12.4% 22.0% 32.4% 47.2% 56.0% 
UEXAC_DDM 0.4% 0.4% 0.4% 1.6% 3.2% 6.8% 8.8% 12.8% 15.6% 22.4% 26.8% 
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Table 11: Regression of Unexpected Accruals on External Debt and Equity 
Financing Indicators 
 
This Table reports results on regressing unexpected accruals on external debt or equity financing 
indicators: UEXAC = α + β * PART + ε. The measurement of all variables can be found in Table 2. All 
variables are deflated by average total assets and reported in percentage. The number of observations is 
131,778. PARTΔDEBT>Q3 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if when the firm’s ΔDEBT is higher than the 
75th percentile of the distribution in the corresponding year, and zero otherwise. PARTΔDEBT<Q1 is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if when the firm’s ΔDEBT is lower than the 25th percentile of the 
distribution in the corresponding year, and zero otherwise. PARTΔEQUITY>Q3 is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if when the firm’s ΔEQUITY is higher than the 75th percentile of the distribution in the 
corresponding year, and zero otherwise. PARTΔEQUITY<Q1 is an indicator variable equal to 1 if when the 
firm’s ΔEQUITY is lower than the 25th percentile of the distribution in the corresponding year, and 
zero otherwise. ** (*) indicates significant at the 1% (5%) level for two tailed test. 
 
External 
indicators Debt Financing Indicator Equity Financing Indicator 
Dependent 
variables PARTΔDEBT>Q3 T-stat PARTΔDEBT<Q1 T-stat PARTΔEQUITY>Q3 T-stat PARTΔEQUITY<Q1 T-stat 
Unexpected accruals without control for ΔXFIN 
UEXAC_MJT 1.91 7.00** -2.44 -10.30** 0.34 1.36 0.53 2.90** 
UEXAC_MJT_R
OA 3.25 13.29** -2.82 -11.43** 1.51 7.78** -1.12 -7.75** 
UEXAC_PMJT 2.81 7.83** -2.54 -6.22** 1.82 7.43** -1.49 -7.01** 
UEXAC_MJC 2.40 11.95** -2.01 -9.62** 1.53 5.71** -0.44 -4.36** 
UEXAC_MJC_R
OA 2.78 13.61** -2.10 -10.33** 1.82 6.80** -0.95 -7.87** 
UEXAC_PMJC 2.61 10.70** -1.89 -6.53** 1.87 6.02** -1.14 -6.67** 
UEXAC_DD 1.20 8.13** -0.81 -4.80** 1.62 7.77** -0.07 -1.04 
UEXAC_DDM 0.56 4.45** -0.36 -2.16* 0.63 4.87** 0.11 1.37 
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Table 12: Testing for Unexpected Accruals Concurrent with Share Repurchase 
 
This Table reports estimated unexpected accruals across quartiles of net external debt financing 
(ΔDebt). The repurchase sample begins in 1988, the year in which the statement of cash flow data 
became available, and ends in 2002 consistent with Gong et al. (2008). UEXAC_ΔXFIN is unexpected 
accruals UEXAC_MJT by using the matching procedure based on industry and ΔXFIN. 
UEXAC_ΔDebt is unexpected accruals UEXAC_MJT by using the matching procedure based on 
industry and ΔDebt. The measurement of other variables can be found in Table 2. All variables are 
deflated by average total assets and reported in percentage. Quartile N for ΔDebt represents firms 
whose net external debt financing falls in the Nth quartile of the whole Compustat sample sorted on 
ΔDebt within each year, where quartile 1 (quartile 4) represents the lowest (highest) quartile. Robust 
t-statistics (in parentheses) use a Huber-White correction for general heteroskedasticity in the standard 
errors. ** (*) indicates significant at the 1% (5%) level for two tailed test. 
 
 UEXAC_MJT UEXAC_PMJT UEXAC_DDM UEXAC_ΔXFIN 
UEXAC_ 
ΔDebt 
Panel A: Unexpected accruals for full sample of firms making share repurchase 
Mean -0.57 -1.08 0.22 0.74 0.57 
T-stat (-2.24)* (-3.35)** (0.96) (1.85) (1.35) 
No. of Firms 1050 1048 440 1005 1047 
      
Panel B: Unexpected accruals for firms making share repurchase across quartiles of net external debt financing 
(ΔDebt) 
      
Quartile 1 for ΔDebt      
Mean -1.85 -1.56 -0.02 0.45 1.11 
T-stat (-3.01)** (-2.08)* (-0.04) (0.51) (1.03) 
No. of Firms 235 235 103 225 232 
      
Quartile 2 for ΔDebt      
Mean -1.17 -2.11 -0.28 2.01 1.09 
T-stat (-2.50)* (-3.21)** (-0.74) (2.51)* (1.38) 
No. of Firms 269 268 122 252 269 
      
Quartile 3 for ΔDebt      
Mean -0.88 -1.07 0.13 0.06 -0.28 
T-stat (-1.89) (-2.18)* (0.25) (0.09) (-0.37) 
No. of Firms 281 281 101 270 281 
      
Quartile 4 for ΔDebt      
Mean 1.47 0.66 1.04 0.45 0.47 
T-stat (2.96)** (0.92) (2.87)** (0.53) (0.60) 
No. of Firms 265 264 114 258 265 
 
 
